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ABSTRACT
This thesis describes the design, development, and resulting curriculum ma-
terials of a new introductory course in digital forensics. This course is part
of a new certificate program in digital forensics at the University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign, along with an advanced digital forensics course and
laboratory exercises that are currently under development. We are design-
ing these courses from the ground up to reflect the multidisciplinary nature
of digital forensics, by incorporating the knowledge of a curriculum devel-
opment team including domain experts from the fields of computer science,
law, social science, psychology, and accounting. To lower the entry barrier for
institutions to adopt digital forensics programs, we are designing the curricu-
lum with the express intent of distributing it as a self-contained curriculum
package including everything needed to teach the course. At the time of
writing, we have taught a pilot class for the introductory course and revised
the curriculum based on our experiences and feedback from the students. In
addition to outlining our program’s progress and high-level goals, this the-
sis presents the introductory course curriculum in narrative form, for those
modules for which I was the primary author, and a brief summary of those
modules for which I was a coordinating assistant.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
As we increasingly rely on digital devices in almost every aspect of our daily
lives, these devices are becoming increasingly involved in legal investigations
of all kinds. Digital forensics (DF) is the science of identifying, collecting, pre-
serving, documenting, examining, analyzing, and presenting evidence from
computers, networks, and other electronic devices. For our purposes, I inter-
pret this to subsume the disciplines of computer forensics, network forensics,
and mobile device forensics. DF is now a major part of many criminal and
civil investigations; its tools are frequently used by law enforcement agencies
and private labs for investigation, data recovery, and diagnostics. Although
digital forensics has already assumed such an important role in our society,
it is still a new and rapidly developing area of study. This presents a chal-
lenging position to the digital forensics education community, that this work
proposes to assist with.
1.1 Literature Review
To begin to understand the current state of the digital forensics education
community and the challenges facing it, I conducted a literature survey of
current higher education programs in digital forensics. While many programs
have curriculum descriptions available online, and these were considered in
developing our own curriculum, such a brief listing does not reveal the im-
portant challenges and design decisions required to understand the state of
the field. Consequently, I restricted my inquiry to those programs with a
published description of their curriculum development in the literature.
Wassenaar et al. [2] describe the certificate program in digital forensics
at Cypress College. They put a clear focus on training students in practical
Parts of this chapter appear in an article currently under review for publication [1].
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skills to prepare them for professional certification. They also require their
instructors to be digital forensics practitioners, and rely heavily on their
personal experience to lend the program credibility, since there is no generally
accepted curriculum model at the college level.
Chi et al. [3] describe their efforts to expand the existing computer foren-
sics course at Florida A&M University, which was previously part of the In-
formation Assurance program, into a cross disciplinary concentration shared
with the department of Sociology and Criminal Justice. This paper explains
their challenges in teaching computer forensics to students without a strong
technical background. Their solution was to create several remedial prep
courses to get the Sociology and Criminal Justice students the prerequisite
knowledge they need to enter the computer forensics concentration courses;
in the process, they shifted the curriculum’s focus much more toward training
in practical skills to prepare students for professional certification.
Srinivasan [4] describes the computer forensics course at the University of
Louisville. They cover a great deal of material, but their target demographics
are restricted to students in the Information Security concentration in their
Computer Information Systems program.
In [5] and [6], Liu describes the development process for Metropolitan State
University’s baccalaureate program in digital forensics. They employed a
“backwards design” or “practitioner’s model” to build the topic list for their
curriculum. Basically, they looked at the needs of their students’ target
industry, clustered them into knowledge groups, and derived topic lists from
these groups. Since they implemented an entire baccalaureate program in
digital forensics, they were able to build the students’ required prerequisite
knowledge for the digital forensics courses and also cover the theory behind
what they were learning. However, one of the most striking things about this
work is the author’s description of all the difficulties they had to overcome,
particularly finding qualified faculty, that illustrate the huge entry barrier
facing institutions that want to adopt digital forensics curricula.
These accounts concur with my impression from personal conversations
with digital forensics educators and from inspecting online curriculum listings
that most digital forensics programs currently have either training based
courses taught by practitioners that teach students how to use a tool and
follow a procedure, or courses that cover theory but restrict the student
demographics to Computer Science or similar majors.
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1.2 Curriculum Standards
Establishment of a standardized curriculum for digital forensics is important
for several reasons. Principally, it provides a means for employers to validate
the qualifications of a recent graduate from a digital forensics program. If the
student graduated from a program using the standard curriculum, employers
can immediately assess the minimum skill set that candidate is likely to have,
without the need of additional evaluations. Similarly, as digital forensics
graduates may serve as expert witnesses in legal proceedings, courts would
also benefit from the added assurance of their expert’s credentials. From
the point of view of a perspective student, standardized curriculum gives the
dual benefit of simplifying the evaluation of degree options and of increasing
the employability of those degrees, for the aforementioned reasons.
These observations are by no means novel, and there have been concerted
efforts from the digital forensics education community to establish standard-
ized curriculum in the past. Most recently, the American Academy of Foren-
sic Sciences’ (AAFS) Forensic Science Education Programs Accreditation
Commission (FEPAC) published, and offers accreditation based on, a stan-
dard that includes digital forensics [7]. However, at the time of writing, only
a single university has adopted this standard and received their accreditation
for digital forensics [8].
We organized and hosted a workshop in the spring of 2013 to facilitate a
dialog among leaders in the digital forensics research, education, and pro-
fessional communities about goals for a curriculum standard and roadblocks
to widespread adoption of such a standard. Different stakeholders presented
their opinions and needs for various aspects of a curriculum standard and
gave their perspectives on what is preventing development and adoption of
curriculum standards in digital forensics.
The discussions at the workshop generated as many questions as answers.
For example, “What prerequisites should be required?”, “What department
should host the program?”, and “What entity should publish the standard?”
This may not seem like progress, but the questions themselves are infor-
mative. The issues presented and questions asked by the attendees of the
workshop indicated that the primary barriers to adoption of curriculum stan-
dards are not pedagogical, but practical. In other words, the main problem
with previously proposed standards was not the topic coverage, but the fact
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that they were difficult to implement at most institutions.
1.3 Challenges
Based on input from digital forensics educators at our workshop, our own
experience, and a review of the literature, I have compiled a list of the prin-
cipal challenges facing institutions wishing to implement digital forensics
programs:
• Balancing training and education
Demand for continuing professional education and certification has
led to development of training based courses that teach digital forensics
as a stepwise laboratory procedure, and neglect to educate students in
the theoretical foundations of what they are learning [9], [10]. The
same pressure is put on many applied disciplines, but it is easier to
resist in more well established fields, such as computer science, because
there is a tradition of higher education providing a balance of skills and
theory, leaving some training to the employer. This poses a significant
problem to institutions interested in providing their students with a
strong theoretical background in their digital forensics program.
• Lack of an adequate textbook on digital forensics
Existing books on digital forensics are mostly written as handbooks
for practitioners, containing useful tips and general information about
best practice based on the authors’ personal experience [5]. While
these contributions are valuable, they offer very little explanation of
the underlying technology or discussion of the theory for the topics, so
are insufficient as textbooks for a course in higher education.
• Finding qualified faculty
Given the absence of a standard curriculum and adequately de-
tailed textbook resources to teach from, digital forensics training and
education must rely heavily on the personal experience of the instructor
[10], [5]. This is particularly problematic given the scarcity of qualified
digital forensics professionals.
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• Lab setup
Licenses for proprietary digital forensics software tools and special-
ized hardware can be prohibitively expensive; even assuming you have
lab exercises planned, installing and configuring equipment for a digital
forensics lab is no easy task [10], [5].
• Selecting appropriate prerequisites
Since digital forensics is essentially an application area at the inter-
section of computer science and law, it has natural prerequisite knowl-
edge from those fields. However, since digital forensics students are
very unlikely to be double majoring in Computer Science and Law, the
question of which prerequisites to require and which to include in the
digital forensics curriculum becomes quite difficult. Most existing pro-
grams opt to require substantial technical prerequisites. This enables
them to easily focus their curriculum on the topics they see fit, but
it restricts their curriculum’s target demographics significantly [5], [3].
Where to draw the line on this trade off was one of the most hotly
debated issues at our workshop, and one that we found particularly
challenging in our own curriculum development.
• Lack of widely accepted curriculum standards
Although proposed curriculum standards exist for digital forensics,
there is no generally accepted model [7], [11], [12], [13]. This directly
contributes to institutions’ problems adopting a digital forensics pro-
gram, by increasing the uncertainty of decision makers and the difficulty
of curriculum development. It also contributes indirectly by exacerbat-
ing the other difficulties as described above.
1.4 Our Program
In this section, I outline our program’s high-level goals, overall direction, and
motivating rationale.
To help address the needs of the digital forensics research, education, and
professional communities detailed in section 1.3, and the broader social need
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for qualified digital forensics practitioners, we are developing a new under-
graduate certificate program in digital forensics.
To lower the entry barrier facing institutions that wish to adopt a digital
forensics program, we are developing our curriculum with the express intent
of distributing it as a self-contained curriculum package containing everything
a Computer Science professor will need to teach the course, including an
instructor handbook detailing the course content, a lab instructor handbook
explaining the lab exercises, PowerPoint slide decks for all lectures, remedial
resources (such as reading lists) for the benefit of students from less technical
backgrounds, and question sets to be drawn from for homeworks and exams.
To the best of our knowledge, this will be an unprecedented contribution to
the digital forensics educational community.
To create a curriculum in line with the fundamentally interdisciplinary
nature of the field of digital forensics, we assembled a curriculum development
team that includes domain experts in computer security, computer networks,
law, civil and criminal justice, fraud investigation, and psychology. We take
a modular approach to curriculum development, with domain experts taking
the lead in developing and teaching topical modules focused on their areas
of expertise. These modules are combined to form a coherent narrative to
expose students to the many important perspectives on digital forensics.
When complete, our program will consist of an introductory and advanced
course in digital forensics with accompanying hands-on laboratory sessions.
The introductory course should be accessible to a wide range of students
from many disciplines and valuable as a standalone offering, if the students
do not choose to take the advanced course as well. The advanced course
is still intended to be accessible to students from many disciplines, but will
target students intending to go into digital forensics professionally, so will be
more technically intensive.
This program will not be a job-track training program intended to prepare
students to directly enter the job market as digital forensic examiners and
analysts. Instead, it will provide a broadly applicable education in the field of
digital forensics that will be valuable for students going into many disciplines
related to digital forensics, such as law, in addition to forensic examiners and
analysts. It is expected that these students will receive additional education
specific to their career paths and some on-the-job training specific to their
eventual professional roles.
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At the time of writing, we have developed the curriculum for our intro-
ductory course and taught a pilot class that was cross listed in Computer
Science and Law. The curriculum for the advanced course is currently under
development.
1.4.1 Program Goals
Several high-level goals have guided the development of our curriculum.
• Lower entry barrier for new institutions to adopt digital foren-
sics programs
As described above, the primary problems facing institutions in-
terested in adopting a digital forensics curriculum are finding a quali-
fied instructor, difficulty and expense of setting up a lab, finding and
selecting an appropriate textbook, balancing training and education,
selecting prerequisites, and the lack of a widely accepted standard cur-
riculum.
Our curriculum is designed to be easily adoptable by other uni-
versities and colleges. So, we made two key decisions to address these
problems. First, the curriculum package will contain everything a Com-
puter Science professor will need to teach the course. We believe that
given sufficiently detailed background material (as provided by our
handbook), the instructor will not need to have industry experience
practicing digital forensics. Second, the laboratory will not require the
purchase of any specialized hardware or software licenses; since the lab
exercises in our curriculum require only open source, freeware tools,
the difficulty and expense of setting up a lab are reduced. Since our
handbook can be distributed to students in place of a textbook, and
adoption of a packaged curriculum removes an institution’s need to
balance training and education or select prerequisites.
• Work toward curriculum standardization
Developing a curriculum standard for digital forensics is a chal-
lenging problem, but we believe we can contribute by distributing our
curriculum as an easily adoptable and widely applicable option. We
presented a draft of the curriculum for our introductory course to the
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attendees of the 2013 workshop, and received very positive feedback and
approval for the course content and modular, interdisciplinary design.
We intend to continue revising and improving our curriculum based
on feedback from the digital forensics research and education commu-
nities, our students, and future technological developments. Thus we
can simultaneously break down the barriers to adoption (by solving
additional logistic issues we hear about) and improve our curriculum
to more closely match the digital forensics community’s requirements
for a curriculum standard.
• Provide students with an education-based introduction to the
field of digital forensics
We believe students should understand the theory behind what
they are doing, not just how to do it. University graduates are mar-
ketable professionals, not because they know how to perform standard
techniques better than a candidates with a training-based educations,
but because their deeper understanding of the principles and theory
underlying those techniques enables them to adapt and innovate when
presented with new problems. Such students will contribute to the field
of digital forensics, not just by performing sound forensic examination
and analysis, but by improving standard practices and finding better
solutions to problems. To this end, we designed our curriculum with a
focus on knowledge and deeper understanding, rather than memoriza-
tion of procedures and standard practices.
• Develop a curriculum that reflects the fundamentally inter-
disciplinary nature of digital forensics
Many different disciplines have important perspectives on digital
forensics. For example, a lawyer, computer scientist, and psycholo-
gist have fundamentally different perspectives on digital forensics. The
lawyer sees it as a way to strengthen his or her case; a computer scien-
tist sees it as a way of understanding and manipulating computers; and
a psychologist sees it as a way of understanding the criminal mind. Our
curriculum is intended to provide students the benefit of those diverse
perspectives by having instructors from relevant disciplines develop and
teach interdisciplinary modules. Rather than just teach students how
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to work in a crime lab examining hard drives, we discuss how digi-
tal forensics skills can be applied to diverse practices. For example,
in network intrusion response, investigations are often focused not on
legal recourse, but damage assessment and mitigation and improving
defenses for the future. These investigations are then fundamentally
different from criminal investigations, because the evidence does not
have to be court admissible, only acceptable to the leaders of the vic-
tim organization, and the identity of the attacker is of secondary im-
portance. We also introduce students to other application areas, such
as fraud investigation, to demonstrate the breadth of application for
digital forensics knowledge.
• Make the curriculum accessible and useful to a broad demo-
graphic from multiple disciplines
We believe that a course on digital forensics would be a valuable
addition to many students’ education, even if they do not intend to
become digital forensics practitioners. There are many practical topics
in our curriculum that are important to everyone. For example, most
students have little or no knowledge of the legal justice system or laws
related to computer crime. Also, knowing what evidence is left behind
by computer and Internet activities can inform better practices, and
some of our students enrolled principally for this reason. After Com-
puter Science students, we found that the second largest demographic
in our pilot class was Law students, who were interested in digital foren-
sics so they could better understand and utilize digital evidence in their
cases.
Design of a digital forensics curriculum that is accessible to such
broad demographics is a particularly difficult problem that we have
not entirely solved. There are two issues that must be addressed to
this end: prerequisites and technical difficulty. The problem is to make
the course accessible without reducing the value for Computer Science
students. We discuss our efforts in this area in the next section.
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1.5 Curriculum Development
This section describes our initial curriculum development efforts, the lessons
we learned from teaching the pilot class and our students’ feedback, and the
revisions we have made based on this experience.
1.5.1 Pilot Class
In the fall of 2013, we taught a pilot class of our introductory course. The
class consisted of two 75-minute lecture sessions and an hour-long lab session
weekly for a full 16 week term.
The introductory course was designed to give students from a wide range of
disciplines an introduction to the field of digital forensics, focused particularly
on the sub-disciplines of computer forensics, network forensics, and mobile
device forensics and providing relevant interdisciplinary perspectives.
It is difficult to give an introduction to a field as broad as digital foren-
sics in a single class, but we were able to cover the major sub-disciplines
and introduce many interdisciplinary perspectives in part because of our fo-
cus on education rather than training. Memorization of standard practices
and procedures would be time consuming, so by removing it, we were able to
increase the breadth of topics in the introductory course. To reduce the com-
puter forensics module to a manageable size, we chose to focus on NTFS and
Windows forensics, as these are the systems students will be most familiar
with and most likely to encounter in practice.
To help us develop an initial working list of topics for our introductory
course, we started by compiling a list of all the topics from all the courses
and recommended curriculum lists we could find, de-duplicating them, and
then organizing them into modules. Within each module, we selected what
we believed were the most important key concepts that could fit into the time
slots available across a semester. To develop the curriculum for these topics,
we started by referencing various textbooks recommended online or used by
other institutions for their digital forensics classes. However, we found (as did
[5]) that most of them were basically handbooks focused only on industry
practice based on the authors’ personal experience. For those topics for
which we were not able to find adequately detailed textbook references, we
gathered the required details from research papers, technical reports, and
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other sources. This had the added benefit of necessitating that we find the
most up-to-date source material available. In addition to these resources, we
incorporated our interdisciplinary curriculum development team’s domain
expertise into the relevant modules. Table 1.1 shows a brief topic list for
each module in our pilot class.
The issue of prerequisites was also difficult to resolve, since, even at an
introductory level, digital forensics is a technically challenging topic that a
student without a strong technical background would have great difficulty
understanding. Simply requiring an operating systems and a networking
course would have been sufficient, but would have shut out the broad inter-
disciplinary demographics our program targets. Fortunately, the majority of
the topics covered in such courses are not necessary background for a digi-
tal forensics course. For example, it is unnecessary to know how to design
context switching and memory management modules to get started in our
computer forensics module. All that is required is a high level of computer
literacy and some basic familiarity with how an operating system works. Our
solution was to require knowledge prerequisites rather than course prerequi-
sites. The course required instructor permission to enroll, and this permission
was only given after the instructor has a conversation with the student and
was satisfied he or she had the necessary level of prerequisite knowledge.
1.5.2 Lessons Learned From Pilot Class
Teaching the pilot class for our new curriculum was a very illuminating expe-
rience for our curriculum development team. While it went quite smoothly
in general, several unforeseen issues became apparent as the semester pro-
gressed.
1. Coordination between instructors/modules was a challenge. We found
it difficult to maintain a good narrative flow between modules. In
retrospect, it is clear that the modules could have been ordered more
efficiently. Some modules had overlapping topics, and the relevance of
some topics needed to be made more explicit.
2. We had differing understandings of the knowledge prerequisites among
the professors. Consequently, some students enrolled in the course who
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Table 1.1: Pilot Class Topic List, by Module
Forensics Concepts
Course outline and syllabus
Define digital forensics and its subfields
Evidence handling
Psychology
Psychology of cybercrime
Criminal profiling
Computer Forensics
Introduction to file systems
NTFS analysis
Deleted file recovery and file carving
Windows Registry, log files, link files, Recycle Bin
Web browser forensics, email forensics, EXIF
U.S. Legal System
Disputes, courtroom workgroup, attorneys
Judges, juries, legal process
Network Forensics
Networking fundamentals review
Network evidence acquisition
Protocol analysis, packet analysis, flow analysis
Application protocols, statistical flow analysis
Network intrusion detection and analysis
Law
Fourth Amendment: reasonable expectation of privacy
Warrant vs. subpoena, Federal Rules of Evidence
Privacy laws, computer crime laws
Fraud Examination
Introduction to fraud examination
Characteristics and skills of a forensic accountant
The nature and extent of fraud, Benford’s Law
Mobile Device Forensics and Malware
Mobile device technology fundamentals
Mobile device evidence extraction and analysis
Mobile network evidence
Legal and ethical considerations of interception
Malware taxonomy, detection, and circumvention
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did not have the necessary technical background to understand the
material. There was a very wide range in levels of computer literacy.
In fact, several of the students were unaware that they were enrolling
in a course that required a high degree of computer literacy. This issue
was especially visible during the hands-on lab exercises.
3. Our pilot class enrollment mainly consisted of Computer Science stu-
dents and Law students. The Computer Science students, and some of
the Law students, had little trouble following the technical material.
However, most of the Law students had difficulties, even with tutoring.
The students’ wide range of computer literacy made it difficult to pace
the exercises appropriately. Although the students who struggled were
a small minority of our pilot class’s enrollment, they represented the
potential interdisciplinary demographics to which we want our curricu-
lum to be accessible. So as the semester progressed, and these issues
became apparent, we reevaluated our curriculum to devise a solution
that would not shut out these students. We observed that many of our
exercises naturally had both investigative/legal components and tech-
nical components. The Law students typically performed better on
the investigative components (e.g. not jumping to conclusions about a
piece of evidence), and the Computer Science students generally per-
formed better on the technical components. The solution we imple-
mented was twofold. First, we decided to put less focus on technical
detail and more on investigative and evidentiary complexities. Second,
we reworked some of the labs into group assignments in which Law
students were required to partner with Computer Science students, We
also wrote a team project where Law students partnered with Computer
Science students and performed different roles; together they submitted
a report on a fictitious case. Grouping them together allowed them to
learn from each other, and we observed positive results, with students
teaching each other their domain knowledge and putting their exper-
tise together to better solve problems. The labs went visibly smoother,
and both Computer Science and Law students commented that their
experience was enriched by interacting with the other majors.
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1.5.3 Student Feedback
The Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics Initiative (I-STEM)
Office at our University was hired to conduct an evaluation of our digital
forensics pilot class. The evaluators conducted surveys and focus groups
to get student feedback [14]. The three surveys over the course of the
semester ascertained the students’ background, experience and impressions
of the course, and suggestions for improvement. The focus groups involved
a dialog between small groups of students and one of the evaluators, who
prompted the students with topics to get the conversation started, but gen-
erally focused on providing an environment for the students to freely share
their opinions of the course.
Feedback from the students in our pilot course was generally quite positive,
with 80% of survey respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing that course ob-
jectives and content were thoroughly covered, and 93% agreeing or strongly
agreeing that they were satisfied with what they learned, for the amount of
time they invested in the course. In particular, students viewed the interdis-
ciplinary aspect as a strength of the course, and said that having multiple
instructors teach the course was useful, helpful, and exciting. This is appar-
ent from their responses in free-form feedback and focus groups, and from
the 70% of survey respondents who agreed or strongly agreed that having
multiple instructors teach the course was helpful. The students also gave
positive feedback for the group work and interactions with students from
other disciplines. Their free-form survey responses and focus group com-
ments show that they enjoyed the cross-disciplinary engagement, and they
felt they learned from the other students. Specifically, 88% of survey respon-
dents agreed or strongly agreed that the group assignment contributed to
their learning.
In the free-form feedback, students also reported issues with several aspects
of the course. Students felt that there was a lack of communication among
the instructors, and that the topics felt out of place and did not fit with one
another. They suggested using a single, longterm case study to connect the
lectures from the beginning to the end of the semester. In addition, some
Law students had difficulty with the technical terminology. They suggested
that instructors provide a sort of glossary of terms for quick reference.
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1.5.4 Revisions
We have revised the curriculum based on what we learned teaching the pilot
class and feedback from the students, and are in the process of developing
several additional items for the curriculum package.
We have changed the module ordering. Specifically, we will put the legal
justice system and law modules before any of the technical material, as those
modules present the wider social impact of digital forensics and how it is
used in court respectively. This will make it clear to students why digital
forensics is practiced before they learn how it is practiced.
We have extended the increased focus on investigative issues, analysis of
evidence, and group activities that we successfully applied to the later por-
tion of the course to the earlier portions as well. These group activities are
not intended to require a legal background for any of the students, as we un-
derstand that it is likely that many institutions will not have students with
such a background in their class. Rather, the activities will encourage stu-
dents to look at the problems from a different perspective. Thus, students
from diverse backgrounds will be more valuable to the group, and all the
students will gain a broader understanding of the issues they are learning
about.
To improve the flow of the course between modules and make the relevance
of topics more explicit, we have written a fictitious case study that will run
through the entire course. The story in the case study will advance as the
semester progresses; new examples and assignments will be tied into the story
to maintain students’ interest and make the “big picture” clear. This case
study will be distributed in the curriculum package, and adopting institutions
may incorporate ours or their own case study and / or examples.
We are also developing three supplementary items for the curriculum pack-
age, to address the problem of varying computer literacy in students, without
shutting out the interdisciplinary demographics.
First, we will compile a primer on technical fundamentals, to be made
available to students before the first day of class. It will contain very brief
explanations of fundamental concepts that are important as knowledge pre-
requisites, to refresh the memory of students who may have taken the relevant
background classes some time ago, and will also contain references to more
in-depth readings for students who are missing specific topics.
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Second, we will provide a glossary of terminology for quick reference. This
will be useful for students from diverse backgrounds who may be familiar
with the concepts, but under different names.
Third, we will include a short prerequisite “quiz” that must be completed
before students can receive the required instructor permission to enroll in
the course. Considering the wide range of technical literacy we saw in our
pilot course, a couple simple questions that would seem trivial to someone
with a technical background, but very challenging to a typical layperson
(e.g., “What is ASCII?”) would suffice. The quiz should take no more than
a couple minutes to complete, with the answers written or given verbally
to the instructor, and would have two primary purposes. First, it would
let students know what sort of course they are enrolling in from the start.
Second, it would deny enrollment to students who simply do not have the
background to understand even the primer material we will make available
to them.
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CHAPTER 2
INTRODUCTORY COURSE CURRICULUM
In this chapter, I present the revised course content, in narrative form, of
those modules for which I was the principle author; namely Forensics Con-
cepts, Computer Forensics, Mobile Device Forensics, and Malware Forensics;
I present brief summaries of those modules for which I was only a coordinat-
ing assistant; namely Legal Justice System, Law, Psychology of Cybercrime,
Network Forensics, and Fraud Investigation.
This course consists of 9 topical modules intended to give students a high
level overview of the field of digital forensics, by presenting the different
sub-disciplines and important interdisciplinary perspectives. The focus is
on the underlying principles and theory governing digital forensics practice,
rather than learning the details of standard practices as a stepwise laboratory
procedure.
2.1 Module: Forensics Concepts
This section presents the material for the first lecture in the course in nar-
rative form1. The purpose of this lecture is to give students a high level
introduction to the basic principles of forensic science and forensic evidence
in general, to put the remaining modules into context.
2.1.1 Lecture: Forensics Concepts
Before we begin our introduction to digital forensics, I want to define a few
terms that do not have a universally accepted definition. For our purposes,
I define forensics, digital forensics, and digital evidence as follows.
1This section is presented in narrative form, so the second person (e.g. “you”) indicates
the students and the first person (e.g. “I”) indicates the instructor.
17
• Forensics is the application of science to legal problems and investiga-
tions.
• Digital forensics is a branch of Forensics involving the recovery and
investigation of Digital Evidence.
• Digital evidence is data that is stored or transmitted using a digital
device and is relevant to a legal investigation,
Thus, any kind of science used in support of a legal investigation is called
a forensic science. For example, DNA analysis, blood spatter analysis, and
ballistics are forensic sciences. When computer science is used to support
legal investigation, it is called Digital forensics.
2.1.1.1 Sub-Disciplines of Digital Forensics
“Digital forensics” is an umbrella term covering several partially overlapping
sub-disciplines.
• Computer forensics is the sub-discipline of digital forensics that deals
with preservation, extraction, analysis, and investigation of digital ev-
idence from individual computers.
• Network forensics is the sub-discipline of digital forensics that deals
with preservation, extraction, analysis, and investigation of digital ev-
idence from network components and servers.
• Mobile device forensics is the sub-discipline of digital forensics that
deals with preservation, extraction, analysis, and investigation of digital
evidence from mobile devices such as cell phones and GPS devices.
These branches are overlapping and distinguished mostly for convenience
of explanation. For example, evidence about network events is generally
considered part of network forensics, but web browser forensics is consid-
ered part of computer forensics. An actual investigation may require skills
from multiple branches of digital forensics, as well as conventional forensics,
such as DNA and fingerprint analysis. There is some debate as to whether
multimedia forensics should be considered a distinct sub-discipline of digital
forensics but in either case, we will not cover multimedia forensics in this
course.
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2.1.1.2 Scientific Method
We will go into more details of the investigative methodologies in the mod-
ules specific to types of investigations, but as a general principle of forensic
science, investigations should follow the scientific method. It is important
that forensic disciplines follow the scientific method because it helps to facili-
tate a more rigorous and ethical investigation, by requiring objective, logical
proof rather than subjective assumptions. The overall objective is to logically
deduce what happened and prove this conclusion accurate with appropriate
confidence. Many of you are likely already familiar with the steps of the
scientific method, so we will focus on how they are applied to a forensic
investigation.
1. Observation
This step basically encompasses everything that happens before you
begin the digital forensics investigation. You will have a certain level of
background knowledge about the case, who is suspected of doing what,
the reason the investigation began etc.
2. Form hypothesis
Before moving forward with the investigation, you must form, or
revise, an investigative hypothesis. This is your proposed explanation
of what happened, based on everything you have observed thus far.
Selecting a good investigative hypothesis is one of the most impor-
tant and difficult steps in a digital forensics investigation. A candidate
investigative hypothesis should be evaluated according to these three
criteria [15]:
• Falsifiability : It must be possible to show the hypothesis to be
false, by some feasible test. If a hypothesis is not falsifiable, then
you cannot make rigorous scientific claims about its accuracy, and
it should not be used as an investigative hypothesis.
• Consistency : The hypothesis must be consistent with all previous
observations.
• Simplicity : Other considerations being equal, a simpler hypothesis
should be preferred.
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A full investigative hypothesis that explains all the observations will
likely be too complex to be tested directly. Instead, you should break
the hypothesis into sub-hypotheses that are easily testable and refutable
and together can confirm or refute the full hypothesis.
3. Prediction
After selecting or revising your investigative hypothesis, you should
use it to predict observations (e.g. If H is true, I expect to find X).
These are predictions of specific items you expect to find if your hy-
pothesis is true. For example, if you hypothesis is that Alice sent
Bob confidential information over email, you might predict that you
will find emails containing confidential information from Alice in Bobs
email inbox.
4. Experimentation
Once you have an investigative hypothesis and specific predictions,
you should conduct tests / experiments and compare the results of these
experiments to your predictions to decide if they confirm or refute your
hypothesis with acceptable confidence. If your experiments prove or
refute the hypothesis, you move on to the next step: conclusion and re-
porting. If your experiments fail to prove or refute your hypothesis, you
must return to the “Form hypothesis” step and revise your hypothesis
based on your new observations, repeating the subsequent steps until
you pass the tests.
5. Conclusion
Once you have formed and proven an investigative hypothesis with
an acceptable confidence range, you must draw conclusions for the
wider investigation and generate your report. The type of conclusions
you draw will depend on the nature of the investigation, which we will
discuss in later modules as appropriate. We will learn some principles
for best practice in writing digital forensics reports later in this lecture.
2.1.1.3 Testing and Experimentation Principles for DF
Designing good experimental tests for digital forensics can be difficult, but
there are a few guidelines that can help.
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The experiments should have a high chance of refuting or confirming the
hypothesis. An experiment that is more likely to provide conclusive evidence
should naturally be preferred to one with a high chance of providing evidence
for which there are many possible explanations.
All tests and other elements of the experiment must be tractable, or feasi-
ble, given the resource and time constraints of the investigation. This will of
course become obvious when you try to execute the experimental procedures,
but it should be considered early in the design process to avoid wasted time.
The experiment should use techniques that are accepted as sound by the
digital forensics academic community. This is a bit less obvious, since a tech-
nique does not become more sound just because people say it is. However, it
is important to remember that your technique and results will be scrutinized
by both sides in the pre-trial and courtroom procedures, and you must be
careful to ensure that the credibility of your analysis is solid. This is im-
portant from the courts point of view, because they have no other way of
evaluating the validity of your methods, which of course they must do.
The simplest and most common type of test would be examination of
an evidentiary device with digital forensics tools and techniques looking for
specific pieces of information. However, more interactive experimentation
is also common. For example, configuring a dummy system to match the
evidentiary system, carrying out various actions on the dummy system, and
comparing the resulting state of the dummy system with the observed state
of the evidentiary device.
2.1.1.4 Refutation
An important principle to ensure an objective forensic investigation is refuta-
tion. The principle of refutation is that tests to confirm a hypothesis should
include attempts to refute the hypothesis. In formal mathematical systems,
this concept is obvious and required for a valid proof, but it is easy to overlook
in an investigation because of confirmation bias.
Confirmation bias is our natural tendency as humans to try to confirm our
initial assumptions. We tend to design experiments that are more likely to
confirm our initial hypothesis than to refute it, and this is very dangerous in
a forensic analysis.
It is often easy to find evidence of a persons guilt, but there may be other
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likely explanations for the evidence. This underlying problem with human
nature makes the principle of “innocent until proven guilty” very important
for forensic analysis. You should not conclude that a person is guilty unless
all other viable explanations are refuted to a reasonable degree of confidence.2
2.1.1.5 Reporting and Testimony
Once your analysis is complete and you have drawn your investigative conclu-
sions, you must generate your report for presentation to the lead investigator
and potentially the court. The form and content of this report will differ
significantly from that of a typical engineering or scientific report in a couple
key respects.
First, the target must be a general lay audience. This differs from the
“educated lay audience” commonly targeted by academic writing, which as-
sumes general domain knowledge, missing only knowledge about the specific
topic of the work. A general lay audience should be assumed to have no
background knowledge outside a typical high school education, so the report
should contain as little technical jargon as possible and have clear explana-
tions of all technical concepts required to understand the evidence.
Second, your report should not state your actual investigative hypothe-
ses and conclusions. Specifically, the report should not contain any explicit
declaration of the guilt or innocence of any party. This may seem counterin-
tuitive, since your investigative hypothesis and conclusion will likely clearly
implicate or exonerate some parties, but it is the responsibility of judges and
juries to decide guilt or innocence. As a forensic expert, your role is to pro-
vide and explain evidence. To make this intuitive, imagine your report as
telling a story, but leaving the ending up to the readers imagination.
In both your report and expert testimony, it is important to avoid making
any speculative statements. As a forensics expert, you should only make
statements directly supported by evidence.
2.1.1.6 Circumstantial vs. Direct Evidence
A very important concept that you should be familiar with when carrying out
an investigation is the distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence.
2I am indebted to Dr. Frank Nekrasz for this explanation
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• Evidence from which you might infer that some event may have oc-
curred, but for which there are other viable explanations, is circum-
stantial evidence.
• Evidence that directly shows that an event occurred, without the need
for any inference, is direct evidence.
Another way of thinking about this is that circumstantial evidence implies
that an event occurred, while direct evidence demonstrates that an event
occurred. A single piece of circumstantial evidence is unlikely to convincingly
support a fact in court, but if many pieces of circumstantial evidence can
be corroborated to eliminate alternative explanations and draw the same
conclusion, a court may accept the conclusion as fact.
This distinction is especially important for digital forensics because digital
evidence is almost always circumstantial. Digital evidence typically directly
links a computer to a specific action, but implicating a person requires cor-
roborating evidence that the person was the one directing the computer to
take that specific action. For example, systems logs, browser history, and
saved files can be direct evidence that a particular account on a computer
was used to access a specific website, but it is only circumstantial evidence
that the owner of the computer accessed the website. However, an eye wit-
ness testifying that they saw the owner using the computer at the time the
website was accessed would directly link the owner to the action of viewing
the website.
2.1.1.7 Forensic Soundness
Before we continue, I would like to define a commonly used term: forensic
soundness. The effective definition of forensic soundness is that a method is
forensically sound if it is rigorously performed according to the best practices
of its respective discipline. Thus, you could consider “forensically sound”
as roughly equivalent to “properly done” or “best practice”. This term is
commonly used to indicate only a method that adheres to standard practices,
but it is sometimes used to indicate a method that also adheres to the ideals
of rigorous scientific method, and it is in the latter sense that I shall use it.
What is considered forensically sound will of course depend on the task in
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question, but there are a few general principles that should be followed to
help ensure forensic soundness.
1. Every interaction with the evidence and every step in the analysis
should be rigorously documented, such that another forensics expert
with the same tools could exactly duplicate your analysis and achieve
the exact same result. In fact, this is often done for particularly im-
portant elements of the analysis. We will talk more about this later in
this lecture.
2. Every realistic precaution must be taken to ensure that the evidence
is not damaged or otherwise altered from its original state during the
acquisition, transportation, and analysis processes. If some alteration
of the evidence is unavoidable, the exact nature of the change must
be documented. We will discuss this at length in each module as we
discuss specific techniques.
3. The analysis must be objective and unbiased. This requires the rigor-
ous application of the scientific method, as we have already discussed,
but should also serve as a guiding principle for every aspect of the
investigation.
Note that “forensic soundness” differs subtly from “court admissible,”
which means “acceptable for presentation in court.” Rules and laws for court
admissibility will be discussed in more detail in the next two modules. It is
very important to note that both forensic soundness and court admissibility
are orthogonal to the distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence.
It is perfectly possible, and very likely, that forensically sound analysis will
result in circumstantial evidence that is court admissible. The distinction
between circumstantial and direct evidence is not in whether the court will
accept the evidence, but in what they do with it.
2.1.1.8 Evidence Integrity
One of the most important considerations in conducting a rigorous, forensi-
cally sound investigation is maintaining the integrity of the evidence. That
is to say that damage or alteration of evidence should be avoided whenever
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possible. Often some minor alterations to evidence are unavoidable during
forensic analysis; in such cases, the exact nature of the changes must be doc-
umented. This is important, not only to ensure that evidence is not lost, but
also to ensure that artifacts inadvertently introduced during analysis do not
confuse the investigation. Forensic evidence is unlikely to be acceptable in
court if its integrity cannot be attested to with comprehensive documenta-
tion.
The integrity of digital evidence is usually demonstrated using crypto-
graphic hash functions. A cryptographic hash function is a function that
takes arbitrary sized digital data as input and outputs a fixed size “hash
value” with three required properties:
• Collision resistance: It is computationally infeasible to find two differ-
ent inputs that produce the same output.
• Pre-image resistance: Given a hash value, it is computationally infea-
sible to find an input whose hash value would match it.
• Second pre-image resistance: Given an input, it is computationally
infeasible to find a different input that will produce the same hash
value.
Note that a cryptographic hash function is a specific type of hash function.
Normal hash functions are simply functions that take a variable length input
and output a fixed length output. A cryptographic hash has more rigorous
requirements that make it suitable for computer security systems, and in our
case, digital evidence.
A digital forensics analyst computes the cryptographic hash of the evidence
as soon as it is received (hopefully immediately after acquisition). If this
cryptographic hash value has been documented, then the integrity of the
digital evidence can be verified at any time by recomputing the cryptographic
hash function of the evidence and comparing it to the previously documented
value.
Often evidence will be handled by multiple people before it makes it to
the digital forensics examiner and its cryptographic hash value is computed.
To ensure the integrity of evidence as it is handled by these various people,
a complete chain of custody must be rigorously documented. The chain
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of custody is the formal documentation of every individual who handled a
piece of evidence. If there is a break in the chain (i.e. some transfer of the
evidence between individuals was not accounted for), then the authenticity
of the evidence can be disputed in court, and it may not be admissible.
2.1.1.9 Sources
The primary sources for this lecture’s material were Eoghan Casey’s text-
books: Digital Evidence and Computer Crime [16], [17], [18] and Handbook
of Digital Forensics and Investigation [19], [20].
2.2 Module: Legal Justice System
In this section, I present a brief summary of the material from the two lectures
covering the United States legal justice system. The instructor and subject
matter expert for this module was Professor Anna-Maria Marshall.
The purpose of this module is to give students an introduction to the
operation of the legal justice system in the United States, focusing on the
different roles and procedures, to familiarize students with the context in
which digital forensic evidence is used. This module presents the court’s
point of view on digital forensics, giving students an idea of how digital
forensics practitioners interact with the system. This module will not go
into specific laws related to digital forensics, which will be covered in the
following module.
2.2.1 Key Concepts
• Disputes : The United States uses an adversarial legal system. Meaning
that when disputes are referred to trial, the parties involved contest
their points under the supervision of an impartial third party (a judge or
jury). This is in contrast to the inquisitorial legal system used by many
other countries, where the impartial third party leads the investigation
directly.
However, disputes are rarely referred to trial. Most are resolved by
settlements negotiated by the courtroom workgroup without the need
26
for a costly and uncertain court proceeding.
• Courtroom Workgroup: The courtroom workgroup is the general term
used to refer to those parties involved in the operation of the court. It
principally consists of the prosecution and defense attorneys, the judge,
the defendant and complainant, and various other roles that assist in
the proceedings, such as clerks and bailiffs. Their combined inclusion
in this “workgroup” implies their shared interest in the smooth and
efficient operation of the court.
• Civil vs. Criminal Court : There are actually two distinct justice sys-
tems in the United States, each with separate jurisdiction over different
types of disputes.
The civil justice system handles disputes between individuals and/or
corporate entities with the typical objective of obtaining some kind of
material compensation. The injured party bringing their dispute to a
civil court is called the plaintiff, and their opponent is called the defen-
dant. Both are represented by their own attorneys, and the decision is
based on a preponderance of evidence, which simply means whichever
side is determined to be slightly more correct wins the case.
The criminal justice system handles disputes between individuals and
the State, where the end objective is to decide whether the individual
is guilty of violating the law and, if so, to determine their punishment.
It is important to note that the victim of the crime is not a party in
the dispute, they are merely a witness, and the prosecuting attorneys
represent the State, not the victim. In a criminal case, a conviction will
only be decided if the guilt of the defendant can be demonstrated beyond
a reasonable doubt. This constitutes a significantly higher standard of
evidence than a civil case.
• Juries : In the United States, cases can be decided juries or judges,
depending on the choice of the defendant. A jury consists of a group of
ordinary citizens called at random to serve as an impartial third party
to decide the final verdict of “guilty” or “not guilty” in the case.
• Standards for Scientific Evidence (Daubert) [21]: In order to be con-
sidered in a legal proceeding, scientific evidence must satisfy certain
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standards (Sometimes called the Daubert test, after the case law that
established them). The two basic requirements for scientific evidence
are relevance, and reliability. Relevance is pretty self explanatory, but
reliability is more subtle and difficult to demonstrate. To determine if
evidence is reliable, five conditions are considered: testing, error rates,
standards, acceptability, and peer reviews. The evidence must be the
result of a falsifiable empirical test. That is to say, it must be possible
for the test to have resulted in the opposite result. For example, if
you want to test if a turkey is finished cooking, a method that always
returns “finished” regardless of the state of the turkey is of little use.
This method must result in quantifiable empirical error rates, it must
be subject to standards governing its operation, it must have received
widespread acceptance among the relevant scientific community, and it
must have been subjected to peer review within that community.
2.3 Module: Law
In this section, I present a brief summary of the material from the four
lectures covering legal principles and laws related to digital forensics. The
instructor and subject matter expert for this module was Professor Jay Ke-
san.
The purpose of this module is familiarize students with the most important
laws governing the seizure, examination, and presentation of digital evidence
in the United States. This module presents a lawyer’s point of view on digital
forensics, giving students an idea of how digital evidence is used in a trial.
2.3.1 Key Concepts
• The Fourth Amendment : This module presents the functional inter-
pretation of the Fourth Amendment that dictates the rules for lawful
searches and seizures in the United States. The Fourth Amendment
specifically protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures,
but what exactly “unreasonable” means in this context is a matter of
interpretation and case law.
The functional interpretation of the Fourth Amendment and later case
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law have resulted in the modern rules governing search warrants. To
obtain a Search warrant an investigator must specify the specific places
and things that will be seized and show probable cause that they will
find evidence of wrongdoing.
There are several caveats to these rules however. The biggest is that
the Fourth Amendment only applies if the individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy for the object being seized. For example, if some-
one leaves a notebook on a park bench, it is not reasonable for them to
expect the contents of the notebook to remain private, so investigators
would not need to obtain a warrant to seize the notebook, but if that
same notebook was left in the owner’s home, they could reasonably
expect that its contents should remain private, and investigators would
need to obtain a warrant to seize it.
• Federal Rules of Evidence: The restrictions on what evidence can and
cannot be admitted to court are called the Federal Rules of Evidence.
These rules are designed to prevent inappropriate evidence from being
shown to a jury, that may introduce an illogical bias to their reasoning.
This is important, because juries are selected at random from ordi-
nary people, who are not expected to have had any legal training or
education in logical deduction.
A few of the more important rules:
– Relevance vs. Prejudice: The probative value (value in finding the
truth) of a piece of evidence must outweigh its potential prejudicial
impact on the jury (the degree to which it is likely to illogically
bias their reasoning).
– Hearsay : Statements made outside of court that are brought up in
an attempt to demonstrate the truth of their contents are consid-
ered hearsay, and are generally not admissible as evidence. There
is an exception to this rule for business records that is very im-
portant to digital forensics. Records that are routinely kept by
businesses are admissible to court.
– Rule 702 : This rule lays out the basic requirements for the opin-
ion of an expert witness to be admitted. An expert’s opinion
is admissible as evidence in court if “(1) the testimony is based
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upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness had applied
the principles and methods reliably to the case [22].” This rather
vague requirement is clarified significantly by the Daubert rules
for scientific evidence, already discussed in section 2.2 above.
• Privacy Law : This module also introduces some of the important laws
that protect individual’s privacy by restricting the actions investiga-
tors can take, specifically the Stored Communications Act (SCA), the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), the Genetic In-
formation Nondiscriminatory Act (GINA), the Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act (CFAA).
2.4 Module: Computer Forensics
This section presents the material for the computer forensics module in nar-
rative form3.
Computer forensics is the sub-discipline of digital forensics that deals with
preservation, extraction, analysis, and investigation of digital evidence from
individual computers. An actual investigation may require skills from mul-
tiple branches of digital forensics, as well as conventional forensics, such as
DNA and fingerprint analysis. However, in this module we will focus on
those digital forensics skills specifically related to individual computers.
This module will consist of 6 lectures intended to give you a high level
overview of the field of computer forensics, with a focus on the principles
underlying the techniques, rather than memorization of standard procedures.
Consequently, we will present examples of important investigative practices,
but rarely go into tool-specific detail.
The lecture topics in this module are: Introduction to Computer Foren-
sics, Introduction to File System Forensics, NTFS Analysis, File Carving,
Windows Analysis, and Windows Application Analysis.
3This section is presented in narrative form, so the second person (e.g. “you”) indicates
the students and the first person (e.g. “I”) indicates the instructor.
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2.4.1 Lecture: Introduction to Computer Forensics
To give you some context for the techniques you will be learning in this
module, I will first give you a brief overview of the high level steps in an
investigation that uses computer forensics. The remainder of the lecture will
be focused on the “preservation” step of this computer forensics investiga-
tive process, beginning with a brief review of some technical fundamentals,
followed by discussion of forensic duplication.
2.4.1.1 Computer Forensics Investigation [18]
Here we present computer forensics investigation as a sequence of discrete
steps, for ease of understanding. In practice, investigations are not likely to
follow such cut and dry steps. As the investigation progresses and new facts
become available, some steps may be repeated, and elements of some steps
may be interposed into other stages as well.
While computer forensics skills can be employed in a variety of contexts,
this formulation specifically refers to the computer forensics process for a
physical crime scene with digital evidence.
1. Preparation: It is important to know what to expect at the scene before
you head out, so you can get the proper items approved for seizure in a
warrant and bring the appropriate hardware and personnel with proper
training for the subsequent steps.
2. Survey : Once you arrive at the scene, you should survey the evi-
dence before touching anything; Take note of all the potential evidence
sources, physical and digital, so you can make the best decisions about
what evidence to preserve based on the situation. This is important,
as collection of one piece of evidence often destroys others. All stages
of the investigative process must be documented, both to attest to the
soundness of the evidence in court and to avoid missing details. During
the survey, you should document what evidence is going to be collected,
how it is going to be collected, and who is going to collect it.
3. Preservation: We will discuss this step in more detail later in this
lecture, but it basically deals with physically seizing and/or making
forensic duplicates of the digital evidence sources.
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4. Examination: This step will be the primary focus of the remainder of
this module, so we will discuss it at length later. Once the devices
and data are secured, you must use digital forensics techniques to find
evidence therein. This is commonly referred to as “examination.”
5. Analysis : Once the evidence has been extracted, you must interpret it
to understand what it means. For example, examination might reveal
that a prefetch file for program X exists, but no entry exists in the
registry or program files for program X. Analysis of this evidence would
result in the understanding that program X was uninstalled sometime
since the last accessed time of the prefetch file. The analysis step is
where you combine the knowledge gained from the digital forensics
evidence with knowledge from other evidence sources and information
about the case to form an overall picture of events and draw conclusions.
6. Reporting : After you have concluded your investigation and drawn your
conclusions, you must write a report for digestion by decision makers.
This should clearly summarize the relevant findings and conclusions
with enough detail to support decisions and potentially be presented
in court.
In a large investigation, these steps would likely be performed by different
individuals. Preparation, survey, and preservation might be performed by
uniformed officers or detectives with some training in digital forensics, while
examination and analysis would be performed by a digital forensics expert
with (hopefully) significant training and experience back at the lab.
2.4.1.2 Preservation Considerations
Depending on the type of investigation, you may only be interested in grab-
bing a few specific files if you know what you are looking for. In cases where
digital evidence is likely to play a more important role and/or you are not sure
what you might need, you should take full bit-by-bit images of the devices.
In some situations, where a suspect may be escaping or human life is in
danger, such as kidnapping, a less forensically sound on-scene examination
may be required. In such situations, the priority would be getting actionable
intelligence as soon as possible, rather than gathering evidence that can be
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presented in court. This is also the case when digital forensics is used in
active military engagements.
If a running computer is encountered, the preservation step is where you
must make the difficult decision to pull the plug or not. At least until the
late 1990’s, it was standard practice to disconnect the power from a running
computer, to prevent damage to evidence in a sloppy on-scene analysis by
an officer with insufficient digital forensics training. With digital forensics
training becoming more widespread in law enforcement and the development
of more sophisticated techniques for analyzing running systems, or “live-
analysis,” there has been a gradual shift away from this cut-and-dry policy.
There is also a growing appreciation of the importance of the digital evidence
lost when disconnecting the power. For example, active network connections,
running processes and their state, unsaved application data, and certain types
of malware only appear in RAM while the computer is running. Most impor-
tantly though, are decrypted files. Many applications and operating systems,
have options to store the users’ data in encrypted form on the hard disk, de-
crypting it as needed for use in memory. We will talk about techniques for
dealing with encrypted files in another lecture, but suffice it to say that this
is an important motivation to attempt a live analysis. However, live analysis
is very difficult, even with the ideal tools for the exact circumstances, and in
general it is impossible to guarantee the integrity of the device data if you
attempt a live analysis. You inevitably have to accept some level of spolia-
tion. Evaluation of whether this type of analysis is possible, warranted, and
worthwhile is a difficult decision that must be made on a case by case basis.
While these techniques and questions are a very exciting area of research,
engineering, and policy, the details of live analysis is are beyond the scope of
this course.
2.4.1.3 File Systems
Before we cover more details of proper data preservation techniques, we need
to cover a few basics, starting with understanding file systems.
The purpose of a file system is to facilitate long term storage and retrieval
of data by a computer. The interface must be standard for interoperability
between computers. An analogy would be the Dewey Decimal System, com-
monly used by libraries to organize books. A person who is familiar with the
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Dewey Decimal System can walk into any library that uses it and easily find
books on the topic they’re interested in.
It will be helpful to understand some basic terminology we will be using
throughout this module.
• A sector is the smallest unit of data that can be read from the hard
disk, typically 512 Bytes. The sector is an atomic unit, so you cannot,
for example, read 4.5 sectors from the disk.
• A volume is a collection of addressable sectors.
• A partition is a collection of consecutive addressable sectors.
• A cluster is a standard size container for storing file contents in NTFS.
The number of sectors in a cluster is defined boot sector and must be
a power of 2.
The distinction between partition and volume can be confusing. Techni-
cally a partition is a volume, but a volume is not necessarily a partition. The
entire hard disk is also a volume and a partition.
The first sector on a hard disk will contain a pointer to a partition table
that lists the location, size, and file system type of every partition on the
device. Before being used by a computer, a partition must be formatted
with a file system. For example, the “C drive” on a Windows computer is
actually an NTFS formatted partition.
2.4.1.4 Basic Hardware Components
There are many other components of a modern computer, some required,
some not, but these are the most important components of a computer to a
digital forensics analyst.
• The CPU is the brain of the computer. It performs arithmetic opera-
tions and issues instructions to other hardware components.
• Memory, or RAM, is the workspace of the computer. It is where pro-
grams store data for quick access while they are using it.
• The hard drive is the storage of the computer. It is where data is stored
when it is not being used.
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• The motherboard is the backbone of the computer. All other compo-
nents plug into it. The firmware running on a motherboard is called
the Basic Input Output System, or BIOS.
2.4.1.5 Forensic Duplication
There are many elements in the process of preserving digital evidence sources.
Most of these are general investigative practices and are shared with conven-
tional forensic disciplines like fingerprint analysis, such as photographing
all objects in their original position before taking them into evidence. The
preservation techniques we are interested in this course are those specifically
pertaining to digital evidence.
Forensic examination should not be conducted on the original device, un-
less the circumstances absolutely necessitate it, since this could lead to in-
advertently damaging the evidence, and the required cautionary measures
would make investigation inconvenient. Instead, an evidentiary drive should
be copied using techniques that do not change the contents of the original
drive. Examiners can then experiment freely on the duplicate disk image
without risk of damaging the original evidence.
The problem of copying all the data in a hard drive without changing any of
it can be somewhat tricky, and examiners usually use specialized proprietary
digital forensics tools to do it. As an interesting side note however, the old
school UNIX tool “dd” can be used to make a forensically sound duplicate, if
you use the right parameters. However, if there is an error in the duplication
process, or the tools are used incorrectly, the duplicate may not be a true
copy of the original, or worse, the original may be damaged. To avoid this,
and to increase the confidence the court will have in the soundness of any
resulting evidence, duplication is usually done with certified digital forensics
tools. The CFTT (Computer Forensics Tools Testing) team at NIST (the
National Institute of Standards and Technology) certifies computer forensics
tools for forensic soundness. Whenever possible, a DF practitioner should
use tools certified by NIST to not alter evidence.
One of the most common problems that can happen if forensic duplication
is done improperly is an alteration of the timestamps of files on the eviden-
tiary device. Timestamp information is critical in reconstructing crimes, and
in some cases, can determine if an action was even illegal. For example, if an
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examination of a disk indicates that the suspect tried to delete a suspicious
file, then it could be destruction of evidence. If the suspect tried to delete
the file after he or she became aware of the investigation, then it is a crime,
if they attempted to delete the file before they became aware of the investi-
gation, then it is not a crime. If the timestamps are not intact, there is no
way to determine this.
Even if the forensic duplication tool is certified to not alter the source, a
write blocker should be employed when imaging an evidentiary drive. Write
blockers prevent a computer from sending write commands to a hard drive.
This functions as a safeguard against damage to the original device, and it
bolsters the court’s confidence in the integrity of the evidence.
There are two general types of write blockers.
• Hardware write blockers are physical devices that sit between a com-
puter making the duplicate and the evidentiary hard disk and intercept
and block any write commands.
• Software write blockers are programs that run on the computer making
the duplicate and attempt to intercept any system instructions that
would result in a disk write command.
2.4.1.6 DCO and HPA[23]
The Device Configuration Overlay (DCO) and Host Protected Area (HPA)
are areas on a SATA or ATA hard disk that are normally inaccessible to the
operating system and other programs, but are sometimes used by the BIOS
to store important recovery information.
A knowledgeable individual can hide files in them however, so they should
be included in the disk image, if they exist. The sizes of the HPA and DCO
are defined by values stored within the hard disk’s internal logic board. If a
SATA hard disk is configured with a DCO and or HPA, the size it will report
when queried with normal read commands will be its true size minus the size
of the DCO and HPA. The partition table will NOT list the HPA or DCO,
so to detect these areas, you (or a tool) must send the
IDENTIFY DEVICE,
READ NATIVE MAX ADDRESS, and
DEVICE CONFIGURATION IDENTIFY
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commands directly to the hard disk, bypassing the BIOS. By subtracting
the pointers returned by these commands, you can determine the size of the
HPA and DCO.
The DCO and HPA can only be accessed with commands that modify
these pointers. After setting all 3 pointers to the actual size of the disk, the
size of the DCO and HPA will be 0. The disk does not erase any data in
doing this, it just moves the pointers indicating the HPA and DCO size. The
SET MAX ADDRESS command is used to set the pointer that delineates the
end of the user addressable sectors. This is the pointer returned by the IDEN-
TIFY DEVICE command. The DEVICE CONFIGURATION SET com-
mand is used to set the pointer delineating the end of the HPA and start of the
DCO. This is the pointer returned by the READ NATIVE MAX ADDRESS
command. But its usage is restricted. You may only use the DEVICE CONF-
IGURATION SET command once to create the DCO. It cannot be resized,
so to remove it you must issue the DEVICE CONFIGURATION RESTORE
command to reset the READ NATIVE MAX ADDRESS pointer to the ac-
tual disk size. Once this reset is done, you may create the DCO again with a
different size. Also note that the DCO cannot be created if there is already
an HPA. You can have both, but you must create the DCO first . After these
pointers have been reset, the data that was inside the DCO or HPA will now
be in user addressable sectors. However, these sectors will not be formatted
with a file system. Many forensics imaging tools will do this for you, and
you should verify whether a tool does this properly before using it.
Note that the DCO is rarely used, and many hard disk manufacturers don’t
implement it properly, so it may cause damage to the data if you use it. If
you detect a DCO on an evidentiary device, It is recommended to take an
image without the DCO and again with the DCO, so at least you have the
user addressable sectors and the HPA.
If there is a Host Protected Area (HPA) or Device Configuration Overlay
(DCO) on the hard drive, then you must send a command to the drive to
change the pointers determining the size of the HPA and DCO to allow
access. But this changes the state of the drive and is considered a write
operation. Some write blockers will not allow these commands to pass, while
others will. In practice, an examiner should know which commands his write
blocker allows, and should check disks for a HPA or DCO before imaging.
Write operations initiated independently by the BIOS cannot be intercepted
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Figure 2.1: Example showing the difference between software and hardware
write blockers. If there was no hardware write blocker here, the ’bar’ write
command would have been executed on the disk.
by software write blockers. If the BIOS were to attempt to write to the
hard disk (probably to the HPA or DCO) a software write blocker would not
prevent the loss of data.
2.4.1.7 Sources
The primary sources for this lecture’s material were Brian Carrier’s textbook:
File System Forensic Analysis [24] and Eoghan Casey’s textbook: Digital
Evidence and Computer Crime [18].
2.4.2 Lecture: Introduction to File System Forensics
Last lecture we covered the preservation step in a computer forensics inves-
tigation. We will now move on to the examination and analysis step, which
will be the main focus of the remainder of this module. While there are many
related areas of computer forensics that can be applied to examination and
analysis, we will start at the lowest level: file system forensics.
File system forensics deals with evidence related to file system events such
as file creation, deletion, and duplication. For example, file system forensics
deals with finding hidden files; recovering deleted files; determining creation,
modification, and last access times; and determining file ownership. Evidence
related to the content of files and the behavior of the operating system and
various applications is outside the purview of file system forensics, and will
be discussed later in this module.
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2.4.2.1 NTFS Basics
Due to time constraints, we have decided to focus on only one file system
in this course. We will discuss NTFS, the file system used by Microsoft
Windows, because it is the most common and most likely to be encountered
in practice.
The Master File Table (MFT) is the key data structure in NTFS. Every-
thing in an NTFS partition, except the boot code, is located in the MFT.
The MFT is actually a list of file records. Every file and directory in an NTFS
formatted partition has a corresponding file record in the MFT. The MFT
allocates a small number of records to start, but it can expand as needed as
more files are added. As more file records are added to the MFT, it may
not be able to fit in a single contiguous region of the disk. In this case, it
would be fragmented into multiple locations on the disk. The MFT itself is
considered a file, and the first file record in the MFT is for itself. This file
record lists the size and location of all sections of the MFT fragmented on
the disk. The file records are always 1024 bytes long, but technically this size
is set in the boot sector, so later versions of NTFS may include a different
size file record. File records contain a standard header and several attributes
depending on the type of file.
The first cluster in a bootable partition is called the boot sector. The
operating system can just look at the first cluster in the NTFS partition,
and knowing it is NTFS, read the location of the first entry in the MFT
from cluster 0. The first entry in the MFT contains the size and location
of the rest of the MFT, which contains all the files in the partition. Note
that the $MFT file record lists the location of the rest of the MFT as cluster
addresses.
2.4.2.2 File record attributes
Attributes are small data structures within a file record that define the char-
acteristics of that file. Each attribute has a header specifying its name, size,
and type-id number. Note that name is not the same as type. There can
be multiple attributes of the same type in a single file record, but they must
have different names. The first instance of each attribute type within a file
record will have a blank name, so only duplicate attributes will have names.
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The attribute header is followed by the attribute content. Since the at-
tributes must be contained in a file record with a fixed length of 1024 bytes,
attribute content that is too large to fit must be non-resident. The header
of a non-resident attribute contains a pointer to a disk location outside the
MFT where the actual attribute content is stored. Strangely, non-resident
attributes are still considered part of the file record, so the “size” of the MFT
is much larger than the end address minus the start address.
NTFS allows for custom attribute definitions, but most file record at-
tributes are of predefined standard types. We will briefly mention a few
of these types here to give you a general context, before we do more in depth
analysis in the next lecture. This is not an exhaustive list, just a sample
of the most important ones for our purposes. Note the naming convention:
Attribute names begin with $ and are all capital letters with underscores to
separate words.
• The $STANDARD INFORMATION attribute stores timestamps, own-
ership, and security information.
• The $DATA attribute contains the actual contents of the file.
• $INDEX ROOT and $INDEX ALLOCATION attributes contain a list
of the files and subdirectories contained in a directory.
• The $FILE NAME attribute stores the name of the file and timestamp
information.
• The $SECURITY DESCRIPTOR attribute stores Access Control List
(ACL) and security properties of the file.
• The $BITMAP attribute stores the allocation status of the MFT.
While both $STANDARD INFORMATION and $FILE NAME attributes
store created, last accessed, and last modified timestamps, they are not nec-
essarily the same values for each. We will discuss the different ways these
timestamps are updated in the next lecture, along with how they can be
clues for an investigation.
Each bit in the $BITMAP’s content corresponds to a file record in the
MFT. If it is set to 1, the file record is allocated (i.e. in use), if the bit is set
to 0, the file record is unallocated (i.e. the file was deleted) and that space
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in the MFT is available for new files. Large directory files will also have a
$BITMAP attribute to store the allocation status of its index.
An Access Control List (ACL) is a list of permissions for how a file can be
accessed. For example, an ACL entry might grant the user “Bob” permission
to read a file’s contents. The $SECURITY DESCRIPTOR attribute does not
actually contain the full specification of the ACL. It contains a reference to
a file that contains the full ACL for every file in the file system. This was
done to eliminate redundant storage to save space, since there are likely to
be few unique ACL configurations shared between many files. For example,
most of user Bob’s files will have identical ACL entries, granting him and the
system administrator access and prohibiting access to other users.
Every file has a $DATA attribute, although it may have a size of 0. Direc-
tories do not normally have a $DATA attribute, but they could technically.
So you could have something like a document file that has sub directories.
This is technically allowed by the NTFS specification, but it highly unlikely
that Windows would create such a file. The first instance of a $DATA at-
tribute in a file record does not have a name, but some forensics tools, like the
one we will be using in this course: “The Sleuth Kit”, will display “$Data”
as the name for the first $DATA attribute in a file. If there is more than one
$DATA attribute, it is referred to as an Alternate Data Stream (ADS).
ADS were originally included to allow compatibility with Mac file sys-
tems. However, Windows now uses ADS to store various file properties that
the user isn’t intended to directly access, such as origin information of down-
loaded files or file authorship information for documents. The contents of an
ADS are not displayed to users by default, but can be accessed easily with
digital forensics tools or even a command prompt if you know the proper syn-
tax. ADS are sometimes used by knowledgeable individuals and malicious
programs to hide data, since a cursory inspection might miss them.
2.4.2.3 Non-base file records
File records have a fixed length of 1024 bytes, but can have any number of
attributes. These attributes can have non-resident content, but the headers
at least must be stored in the file record. If the number of attribute head-
ers grows too large to fit in a single file record, then a non-base file record
is allocated. This actually happens more often than you might think, be-
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Figure 2.2: File record with ADS. Note the second attribute of type
$DATA named “Secrets” Secrets is an ADS. A forensics tool would show
the ADS, and it could be accessed from the command prompt using the
syntax “filename:Secrets”. For example, if the file was named “temp.txt”,
you could display the content of secrets in notepad by typing “notepad
temp.txt:Secrets” at the command prompt in the directory containing
“temp.txt”.
Figure 2.3: Non-base file records. Note the $ATTERIBUTE LIST attribute
indicates the location of the non-base file records.
cause non-resident content can become fragmented, especially for large files.
The location of all the fragments must be tracked in the $DATA attribute’s
header. The header of a non-base file records will have a pointer to the
base file record, and the base file record will have an $ATTRIBUTE LIST
attribute that contains a list of each of the file’s attributes and pointers to
the non-base file records that contain them.
2.4.2.4 Encryption
Encryption is a widely used method of preventing unauthorized persons from
reading private data. It has many legitimate uses and is essential to make
tasks like online banking secure. However, it is also often used by criminals
to hide incriminating digital evidence, and it is in this context that it is
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important to our current discussion.
Encryption is performed by supplying an encryption function with a secret
key and applying it to some data you wish to hide. The encryption function
uses the secret key to scramble the data in such a way that it is almost
indistinguishable from random data. The resulting scrambled data is often
referred to as ciphertext or simply encrypted data. In order to read the data,
you must use the appropriate decryption function with the same secret key
that was used to encrypt the data. This will return the original data. Thus,
the secret key is like a password for accessing the encrypted data.
If you encounter encrypted files during an investigation, you have two basic
options. You could attempt to brute force the encryption, which basically
means have a computer try and guess many encryption keys until it finds
the correct one. However, the difficulty of brute forcing an encryption key
depends on the strength of the key. If the secret key is very poorly chosen, or
the encryption function is flawed in some significant way, then a decryption
tool can find the secret key quickly. However, brute forcing data that was en-
crypted using a modern encryption function, like AES256, with a well chosen
secret key would likely take millions of years, even using a supercomputing
cluster.
The other option is to find the secret key by other means. Sometimes peo-
ple will write their passwords and encryption keys in notebooks, and these
should be located in the physical investigation. Another common mistake
people make is to use their login password for their computer or other ac-
counts as their encryption key. Digital forensics tools can often recover login
credentials stored by web browsers.
There is another problem with encrypted data in an investigation. There is
some debate as to whether encrypted files require a separate search warrant,
so make sure your warrant has provisions for decrypting files, or it could
constitute illegal search and compromise the resulting evidence.
2.4.2.5 Sources
The primary source for this lecture’s material was Brian Carrier’s textbook:
File System Forensic Analysis [24].
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2.4.3 Lecture: NTFS Analysis
In this lecture we are going to go more in depth with the way NTFS works
and some of the potential evidence sources in NTFS analysis. We will also
begin our discussion of deleted file recovery.
2.4.3.1 File System Metadata Files
In addition to the files created by the user and operating system, NTFS
requires its own internal metadata files. These files are used to operate
and organize the file system, and a solid understanding of their purpose and
usage is required to conduct sound forensic analysis of a Windows file system.
Since they are hidden from the user, they can be some of the best sources of
digital evidence. Even if you are using a highly automated tool to assist your
analysis, you need to know what the tool is doing in order to interpret and
report your findings accurately and explain them in court if you are called
as an expert witness.
• $MFT
As we covered in the last lecture, the first file record in the MFT is
for the $MFT file itself. All other file records are non-resident content
of the $DATA attribute of the $MFT file record. Thus by processing
the header of the $DATA attribute of $MFT, you can find the clus-
ter addresses (disk locations) of all the other file records. The $MFT
file’s $BITMAP attribute is used to manage the allocation status of
the MFT records (i.e. whether they are deleted or not). The $STAN-
DARD INFORMATION attribute of the $MFT file stores the date and
time the file system was created, and it not updated in normal opera-
tion.
• $MFTMirr
Since so much of NTFS operation depends on the MFT, it can be
a single point of failure if it is corrupted. The $MFTMirr file stores a
backup of some of the most important entries in the MFT. The $DATA
attribute of the $MFTMirr file contains the file records for the first 4
metadata files in the MFT: $MFT, $MFTMirr, $LogFile, and $Volume.
It is non-resident, and its content is always stored at the middle of the
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volume, far away from the rest of the MFT. Thus if the start of the
MFT is corrupted or accidentally overwritten somehow, a recovery tool
can look in the middle of the volume to find the file records for $MFT,
$MFTMirr, $LogFile, and $Volume. The file record for the $MFT
will contain pointers to all the remaining file records, the $LogFile
file which can be used to restore the file system to a safe state, and
the $Volume file contains important version and status information.
A digital forensics examiner or a recovery tool may be able to use the
$MFTMirr to restore a partially corrupted volume, such as one that has
been partially overwritten, or somehow damaged during acquisition.
• $Boot
The $Boot file contains the boot sector of the file system. The
non-resident content of the $DATA attribute of the $Boot file must
be located at sector 0 of the volume, and contains the information
required to load the file system. It will contain the location of the start
of the MFT, the size of clusters and file records, the file system’s serial
number, and the boot code. The boot code comprises instructions to
locate and load the code to initialize the operating system, if this is a
bootable volume. A backup copy of the boot sector is sometimes stored
in the unused space between the end of the file system and the end of
the volume.
• $BitMap
Not to be confused with the $BITMAP attribute. the $BitMap file
defines the allocation status of all the clusters in the file system. The
$DATA attribute of the $BitMap file contains the actual bitmap, with
a 0 indicating an unallocated cluster and a 1 indicating an allocated
cluster.
2.4.3.2 NTFS Indexes
Several important mechanisms in NTFS depend on indexes. While there are
various types of indexes, they are all basically collections of index entries.
Each index entry contains a header and an attribute of some kind. The type
of attribute in the index entries depends on what the index is used for. The
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details of the allocation algorithms and data structures used to store these
index entries is beyond the scope of this course, and not important for our
discussion here.
The most common indexes are directory indexes, where each file in the di-
rectory has a corresponding directory index entry containing a $FILE NAME
attributes and a pointer to the file record for that file. Directory indexes are
stored in the $INDEX ROOT and $INDEX ALLOCATION attributes. If
there are only a few entries, only the $INDEX ROOT is needed, but for
large directories, the $INDEX ALLOCATION is used as well. Note that
these directory indexes are not the same as the directory tree you see in
Windows Explorer (e.g. “C:\Documents\foo”); every directory has its own
index.
2.4.3.3 More Attribute Details
The $STANDARD INFORMATION attribute exists for all files and directo-
ries. It contains time stamp information for “Created”, “File Modified” (last
time the content of $DATA or the $INDEX * attributes were modified),
“MFT Modified” (last time the metadata of this file was modified, which is
not shown to the user in Windows), and “Accessed” time (time the $DATA
was last read from or written to). Note that this is not the only attribute that
contains these timestamps, but the $STANDARD INFORMATION times-
tamps are the primary ones. These timestamps are critical for an investiga-
tion to correlate digital evidence and reconstruct a timeline of events.
This attribute also contains ownership and security information that can
help link a file to a specific user account. For example, if only Bob’s ac-
count can access the file, then someone with Bob’s password must have put
it there. Note that this assertion makes a critical (and sometimes false) as-
sumption: that the file was added using default Windows file management
mechanisms. Enforcement of ownership and security requirements is volun-
tary unless encryption is used, which is not the default, so if the file system
is mounted by a non-Windows operating system then files can be placed any-
where, and the ownership information can be forged. What you can really say
is, “someone with access to this computer put these files here.” The $STAN-
DARD INFORMATION attribute also contains a flag for general properties
of the file, such as read-only, compressed, sparse, or encrypted.
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For every file and directory there is at least one $FILE NAME attribute in
its file record and at least one in its parent directory’s index. This includes
directory files. This attribute contains a pointer to the file record of its par-
ent directory, and its parent directory’s $FILE NAME attribute will have a
reference to its parent directory, and so on. This is very important, because
when files are deleted their parent directories have their indexes sorted, of-
ten overwriting the index entry for the deleted file. However, the file record
for the deleted file will not likely be overwritten right away. With the par-
ent directory pointer in the $FILE NAME attribute of a file, you can often
reconstruct the full path to a deleted file.
The $FILE NAME attribute also contains “Created,” “File Modified,”
“MFT Modified,” and “Accessed” timestamps, like the $STANDARD INFO-
RMATION attribute, but the timestamps on the $FILE NAME attribute are
not usually updated by Windows, so they often correspond to the time the file
was created. This can be important in an investigation, because if a suspect
intentionally modified the timestamps on some files to mislead investigators,
he or she most likely modified the $STANDARD INFORMATION times-
tamps, and the true file creation date can often be found in the $FILE NAME
attribute.
2.4.3.4 File Deletion Example[24]
To tie all this discussion together, we will go through an example of what hap-
pens under the hood in NTFS when a file is deleted. Note that you can find
the file record for the root directory, because it is always file record number
5, and you can traverse the directories by processing their $INDEX ROOT
and $INDEX ALLOCATION attributes to find pointers to the file records
of the files and directories they contain. The general steps for deleting the
file “C:\Examples\file.dat” are as follows.
1. Process the $INDEX ROOT and $INDEX ALLOCATION attributes
of the root directory’s file record to find the file record for the “Exam-
ples” directory. Update the last accessed time of the root directory.
2. Process the $INDEX ROOT and $INDEX ALLOCATION attributes
of the “Examples” director’s file record to find the file record for “file.dat”.
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3. Remove the index entry for “file.dat” from the “Examples” directory
index and resort the index if needed. Update last written, modified,
and accessed times for “Examples” directory.
4. Deallocate the file record for “file.dat” by clearing the “in-use” flag in its
file record header and clearing the corresponding bit in the $BITMAP
attribute of the $MFT file record. Recall that the $BITMAP attribute
of the $MFT file record indicates the allocation status of the file records
themselves.
5. Process the headers of the non-resident attributes in the file record for
“file.dat” to find the clusters storing the non-resident content. Set the
corresponding bits to 0 in the $Bitmap metadata file.
Note that the non-resident content clusters were NOT overwritten and
the file record the “file.dat” was NOT overwritten, they were just marked as
unallocated. So until the file system creates another file in that same memory
location, the metadata and pointers are still there. This will be important
for our next topic: deleted file recovery.
Recall that the $Bitmap metadata file stores the allocation status of all the
clusters in the file system. Not to be confused with the $BITMAP attribute
of the $MFT file record, which stores the allocation status of the file records.
A file record marked as unallocated in the $MFT file record’s $BITMAP
attribute is only available for reuse as a new file record in the MFT. The
clusters it is stored in are NOT marked as unallocated in the $Bitmap meta-
data file. Clusters marked as unallocated in the $Bitmap metadata file are
available for reuse in any way, such as storing non-resident attribute content.
2.4.3.5 Deleted File Recovery
Probably the most important application of file system forensics is deleted
file recovery. Deleted files can be important to an investigation, not just
for their contents, but also the fact that the user attempted to delete them.
Attempting to delete files can constitute destruction of evidence, if the user
is aware that they are under investigation at the time of deletion. The
techniques we will cover in the remainder of this lecture and the next lecture
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are also widely used in private practice to recover accidentally deleted or
damaged data.
If the file record for the deleted files remains intact, the process of recovery
is very easy. You can simply look for file records marked as not in use. If the
attribute content is resident, you can just read it from the file record. If the
attribute is non-resident, like the $DATA attribute of a large file, you can
follow the pointers in the non-resident attribute’s header to find the clusters
on the disk that have the file’s data. Tools will do this automatically by
looking through the MFT for file records marked as not in use and looking at
their $FILE NAME attributes to reconstruct the files’ paths. Thus when you
browse a file system in an investigative tool like Autopsy, it shows deleted
files in the directories they were deleted from. This process is sometimes
called “undelete” when software advertises it as a feature. Note that this
only works if both the file record and the file’s non-resident content have not
been overwritten.
2.4.3.6 Sources
The primary source for this lecture’s material was Brian Carrier’s textbook:
File System Forensic Analysis [24].
2.4.4 Lecture: File Carving
In the last lecture, we learned about how to recover deleted files when the
file record and file content remains intact, but if the file record has been
overwritten for use by another file, then you cannot follow the pointers in
the attribute header to find the attribute’s content. However, as long as
the non-resident attribute content has not been overwritten, you can still
recover it. Recovering data without using the file system metadata is called
file carving. You may note in the following discussion that all file carving
techniques require you to know the type of file you are looking for.
Modern file systems tend to overwrite the metadata for files when they
are deleted, but also manage their data better, so there are lower levels of
fragmentation, making file carving more necessary and viable. Note that this
behavior is actually implemented in the operating system level in Windows,
49
Figure 2.4: Deleted file recovery with metadata. As you can see, if the file
record has not been reallocated and the content clusters have not been
overwritten, then you have all the information required to access the file as
if it had never been deleted. You just need a forensics tool to view it,
because the OS will not display these unallocated files.
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Figure 2.5: Basic header-footer file carving. Although the file record
metadata was overwritten with a new file record, the jpeg can be recovered
by searching for “FFD8” and “FFD9” and carving the data in between.
the NTFS version has not been updated since XP, but Windows 7 nonetheless
overwrites the file records of deleted files much more quickly than XP.
2.4.4.1 Basic File Carving Techniques
In the simplest case, a file’s non-resident clusters are all intact and not frag-
mented. That is to say, they all exist in a contiguous section of the disk. In
this basic case, there are several techniques for file carving.
• Header-footer carving : Most file types have a unique sequence of values
at the start and end of the file. For example, the header of jpeg files
always begins with the string “FFD8” and the footer ends in “FFD9”.
If you search the disk until you find a header value, then search the
following data until you find the footer value, then the data in between
is most likely a jpeg. In this basic case there is not much difficulty
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in recovering known file types, and there are many tools that do this
reliably, but some difficulties can arise. For example, if the file type
does not have a known footer signature, you have to try to figure out
the length of the file. This is often in the header, but if the file format
is proprietary, it may be difficult to locate reliably. Sometimes files are
embedded in other files, such as jpegs in word documents. These can
disrupt file carving tools and lead to incorrect results.
• File structure based carving uses the internal layout of a file. If there is
standard information in the file other than the header and footer, such
as identifier strings and size information, this can be used to carve the
file.
• Content-based carving : Some tools are able to leverage patterns in
the content of files to find them on disk. Some things they look for
include structured data, such as HTML and XML files, character count,
language recognition, statistical attributes, and information entropy.
2.4.4.2 Carving with Fragmented Clusters
You will recall that I have mentioned fragmentation several times, but I
never really defined it. For the following discussion it is important to know a
little bit more about fragmentation. Fragmentation is when the non-resident
content of an attribute is stored in multiple locations on the disk, rather
than one contiguous block. The non-resident attribute’s header will contain
multiple pointers, one to each block of clusters the file is stored in.
Fragmentation happens for various reasons. For example, when the parti-
tion is close to full, and no large unallocated blocks are available, or a file’s
size grows significantly after it is initially allocated, so it no longer fits in the
small unallocated block it was originally placed in. Fragmentation is becom-
ing less common as modern operating systems implement better allocation
techniques. Another contributing factor to the decrease in fragmentation is
that most of the data volume on modern hard drives often consists of me-
dia files, which are copied and read, but not modified in size, so they don’t
fragment as often.
The real difficulty with file carving comes in when the file is fragmented on
disk. There are many theoretical mechanisms for reconstructing fragmented
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Figure 2.6: File fragmentation. Note the file record contains pointers to the
different fragments.
files, but only a few have been successfully used on real data sets. Two
techniques for carving fragmented files that work in practice are Bifragmented
Gap Carving and SmartCarving.
Bifragmented Gap Carving [25] only works if the file is in exactly two parts.
Basically, the first one has the header, the second the footer. So you take
all the headers and try to match them with the footers. The difficulty is
that the two fragments are both more than one cluster long, so you must
determine where the fragments begin and end. You can identify the header
and footer cluster, but you only know that some number of clusters after the
header and some number of clusters before the footer are part of the file.
Let the gap size g denote the number of clusters between the header and
footer that do not belong to the file. For each g starting at 1 up to the
distance between the header and footer clusters, remove every possible set of
g contiguous clusters between the header and footer and attempt validation
on each attempt.
This is guaranteed to work if the file is in two fragments, all its clusters
are intact, the header fragment is before the footer fragment, and you have a
reliable validation mechanism, but it does not scale well for large gap sizes.
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Figure 2.7: Bifragmented Gap Carving example. The “gap” (red squares)
at each iteration is varied until the correct configuration is reached, where
the “gap” is aligned with all the non-jpg clusters between the jpg fragments.
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The worst case runtime is O(nd2) where d is the number of clusters between
the header and footer and n is the number of files being carved. Missing or
corrupt clusters will result in the worst case runtime frequently.
SmartCarving is a technique based on research published in 2009 by Anand-
abrata Pal and Nasir Memon that works well for carving jpeg files fragmented
into more than two parts [26].
SmartCarving consists of three high level steps:
1. Pre-processing : in this stage any compressed or encrypted clusters are
decompressed and decrypted, and all allocated clusters are removed.
Reducing the number of candidate clusters is critical to improving the
performance of the subsequent reassembly.
2. Collation: in this stage, the clusters are classified by file type. Vari-
ous heuristics are used to identify file type, such as keyword searches,
ASCII detection, entropy, and file signatures. Successfully classifying
the clusters breaks the problem into parts and again reduces the num-
ber of inputs to the subsequent step.
3. Reassembly : in this stage, the filtered and classified clusters are taken as
the inputs to a fairly complicated algorithm called sequential hypothesis
parallel unique path (SHT-PUP), the details of which are far beyond
the scope of this course, but it basically starts with the header for a
file and iteratively finds subsequent fragments in the file.
The end result is a very effective reconstruction of fragmented files, even
those fragmented into as many as four parts.
2.4.4.3 Slack Space
So far we have been talking about recovering files that have been deleted,
had their file records overwritten, and even files whose content is fragmented
across multiple areas of the disk, but what about a file whose non-resident
clusters have been reallocated to a new file?
It turns out that even in this case, some data recovery may be possible.
The trick is slack space. Disk space in a file system is allocated in fixed
chunks, called clusters in NTFS, and the size of a file’s content is rarely an
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Figure 2.8: Slack space. Here you can see a file that was overwritten by a
smaller file. The original file is an email from G.G. Criminal, that we
definitely want everything we can get about, and the new file is a shopping
list. If we did a keyword search for “G.G. Criminal” this cluster would
come up.
exact multiple of the cluster size. So you often have some extra space left
over at the end of a cluster. This extra space is called slack space, and in
some cases it can still contain useful information. For example, if you are
looking for a fairly large text file, and it’s clusters were reallocated to a small
file, you can just read the remainder of the text file from slack space. You
can find data like this if you are looking for the non-resident content of a file
whose file record is not overwritten, but its content has been, or if you are
looking for a file with some unique characteristics, like a keyword or specific
structural semantics, like a C source file.
2.4.4.4 SSD Forensics [27]
Solid State Drives (SSDs) are large scale storage devices for computers that
offer much faster data retrieval than hard disks. They are still several times
more expensive per unit of storage than hard disk, but the price is going
down, and they are becoming more popular, so it is important to understand
the implications they have for digital forensics.
SSDs use a completely different method for storing data than a hard disk.
A hard disk stores data as magnetic signals on spinning platters. SSDs store
data in flash memory, like a USB thumb drive, but redesigned to allow much
more data density. So far so good. How does this effect forensics then? The
difficulty stems with two facts:
1. Flash memory degrades every time you write to it, so frequently writing
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to the same location in flash memory will damage the device.
2. Flash memory can be written to and read from very quickly, but you
cannot write over saved data. The data must be erased in chunks called
blocks before it can be written to.
You can think of flash memory like an “Etch-A-Sketch.” You can write
black lines as much as you want to make a picture, but to clear the screen
for a new picture, you must shake it and erase all the black lines at once.
Likewise in flash memory, you can set bits from 1 to 0 as much as you want,
but to set them back to 1 you have to erase the whole block they are stored
in, and this process is much slower than reading data and writing 0s.
To solve these two problems, SSD developers designed internal smart con-
trollers for SSDs that do wear leveling and garbage collection. In wear lev-
eling, the controller writes data to different locations on the drive based on
which parts of the drive have been used least recently. To allow data to be
retrieved while doing this, the controller maintains an internal mapping from
the virtual sector addresses that the operating system sees and the actual
physical location of the data.
The obvious consequence of this is that the device will quickly fill up with
1s and 0s and the controller will no longer be able to write. The solution
is garbage collection. When physical blocks of flash memory are no longer
needed, they are marked for garbage collection. There is a garbage collector
process that constantly runs in parallel with the normal reads and writes and
goes through the SSD and erases blocks marked for garbage collection.
So far, this still would not cause a problem for forensics, because the SSD
controller would not know which files were marked as “unallocated” by the
file system, so it would not mark them for garbage collection. However, the
SSD developers introduced another optimization: the “TRIM” command.
Operating systems (on behalf of their file systems) can now send a “TRIM”
command to the SSD controller when they delete a file to indicate that it can
be reused for new files. This greatly improves the efficiency of the garbage
collection and the performance of the SSDs. However, it also means that
files in unallocated space (the very files we are trying to recover as forensic
analysts) will only remain on the disk until the garbage collector gets around
to erasing their blocks. This usually only takes a few minutes.
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It is still possible to recover files that were deleted from an SSD if you pull
the power within a couple minutes of the file deletion, then physically disas-
semble the device and disconnect the controller, to disable garbage collection,
and attach custom hardware to the flash chips to read the data directly. But
this process is obviously impractical in almost all situations. So as it stands,
there is not really a reliable method of recovering deleted data from an SSD.
Figure 2.9 shows a demonstration of how the wear leveling and garbage
collection work. In practice files do not neatly fit into SSD memory blocks
like this, but its easier to visualize this way.
In step 1, on the top left, has three ready blocks, a block marked for
garbage collection, a text file, and a jpeg file.
In step 2, you see the state after the operating system writes to the jpeg
file. Since the SSD cannot write to the block the jpeg is in, it writes to
a ready block and marks the old version of the jpeg for garbage collection.
Note the garbage collector is always running, and it erased the previously
marked block.
In step 3 you see what happens after the OS edits the txt file and creates
a doc file. As before, the new version of the txt file and the new doc file are
written to a new location, and the old version of the txt file is marked for
garbage collection. The garbage collector erases the old jpeg so that block is
ready again.
In step 4, you see the state after the OS writes to the doc file. The new
version of the doc file is written to a ready block and the old one is marked
for garbage collection. The garbage collector erases the old text block.
2.4.4.5 Sources
The primary sources for this lecture’s material were articles by Garfinkel [25],
Pal [26], and Gobanov [27].
2.4.5 Lecture: Windows Analysis
So far in this module, we have discussed file system forensics with a focus on
NTFS, and deleted file recovery. We have been treating the contents of files as
a black-box, and ignored evidence related to operating system behavior. We
will now give an introduction to the larger part of computer forensics: that
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Figure 2.9: SSD garbage collection. In this figure, Blue is a valid file, Red is
a file marked for garbage collection, and White is an erased block, ready for
writing.
dealing with evidence related to operating system and application specific
behavior. These subjects comprise the majority of the field of computer
forensics, and we will only have time to cover a small portion in the two
remaining lectures of this module.
The discussion in this lectures will give you an idea of what kind of evidence
can be extracted from the operating system using computer forensics, by
presenting specific examples and techniques that are particularly common
and useful in computer forensics investigations. We will limit our topics to
Microsoft Windows systems, since they are the most common and most likely
to be familiar to you.
2.4.5.1 Registry
Windows stores persistent settings and usage information, such as autocom-
plete values, in the Registry. Basically, if Windows remembers it after a
reboot, it’s probably stored in the registry. A program running on Windows
can use the registry to store its configuration, but this is optional. Some
programs use their own files for configuration. Registry files are called reg-
istry hives and are located in “C:\Windows\system32\config” on Windows
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Figure 2.10: Registry keys and values. Here is an example view of the
registry of a Windows 7 machine, viewed using the default Windows
registry editor.
7. There is also a dedicated registry hive for each account on the system,
stored in a file named “ntuser.dat” in the user’s directory.
From the file system’s point of view (and thus yours if you open the “sys-
tem32\config” folder in Windows Explorer), these registry hives are just
single files, but if you open them in a registry editor like “regedit.exe” you
can view their internal structure. The internal structure of a registry hive
is much like the directory structure of a file system. Instead of directories,
registry hives have keys and instead of files they have values. Like directo-
ries and files, keys can contain values and/or subkeys. Like files, these keys
can be stored in various formats, some are binary, some are plain text, some
are hexadecimal. Registry keys have a “last written” timestamp that is not
displayed in the default “regedit.exe” registry editor in Windows. You can
view these timestamps in a tool like “Registry Commander,” and they will
be shown if you export the registry key to a plaintext file.
The importance of the Registry to computer forensics can hardly be over-
stated. Information about almost every Windows component can be found
there. There are many many registry keys that are of potential interest to a
computer forensics investigator, but we only have time to cover a few, so I
will point out a couple interesting ones.
• Using these registry keys, you can see which user account was last
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logged into the system, when they logged out, and which account was
last used to shut the computer down. Particularly the first two are
important, because they allow you to attribute events, modifications,
etc. to a specific user account, rather than just a computer. Since com-
puters often have multiple users, this step is one of the most important
elements of the investigative process. To see who logged in last, you
can view the
“Microsoft\Windows \CurrentVersion\Authentication\LogonUI”
key in the
“HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\SOFTWARE”
registry hive. The “LastLoggedOnUser” value of this key shows the
username of the last user account used to log into the system. The
“LastLoggedOnSAMUser” value of this key shows the domain and user
id of the last user account used to log into the system. To see who last
shut the computer down, you can view the
“CurrentControlSet\Control\Windows”
key in the
“HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\SYSTEM”
registry hive. The “ShutdownTime” value gives the time the system
was last shut down, in binary, and the last write time on a user’s
“ntuser.dat” file indicates when that user logged off. These last two
combined can give an indication of which user was last to shut the
system off.
• Another key piece of information you can get from the registry is a list
of recently attached USB devices. This information can be useful if you
have not found an important USB device, you may need to look for it,
or if you have the device, you can use the registry to establish a time
that it was used by a specific account. The
“CurrentControlSet \Enum\USBSTOR”
subkey stores recently attached USB devices’ information. The names
of the first level subkeys under USBSTOR are device class identifiers
taken from the device descriptions that identify the specific kind of USB
device attached. The second level subkeys are the serial numbers that
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uniquely identify the particular instance of the device (or if Windows
cannot read the serial number of the device, a pseudorandom identifier.
If the second character is an “&” it is indicative that the device does
not have a serial number). So, two devices of the same type will have
different unique ids but be under the same first level subkey.
To determine a device’s installation time, you can search for the de-
vice’s serial number in the “c:\Windows\setupapi.dev.log” file. This
will show the time the device was first connected to the system.
If the system is running Windows Vista or 7, you can view the history
of USB devices attached in the
“Microsoft\Windows Portable Devices\Devices”
subkey of the “HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\Software” hive along with
their display name, the name that is shown in Windows Explorer when
they are attached.
• The list of files last played in the Windows Media Player can be found
in the
“<sid>\Software\Microsoft\MediaPlayer\Player\RecentURLList”
subkey of the “HKEY USERS” hive, where sid is the security id of
the user. These keys will display the full path to the last played file,
showing if it was on one of the partitions of an internal drive in the
computer or an external drive, and could give you a lead. If you don’t
find a file in that location, you can try to do deleted file recovery or file
carving, and if it is from an external drive, you can look for external
hard drive, which may contain additional evidence.
• The “Microsoft\Internet Explorer\TypedURLs”
subkey of the “HKEY USERS\SOFTWARE” hive lists the last 25
URLs typed into the address bar in Internet Explorer. This is slightly
different than the internet history, which shows the recently visited
website URLs. By showing the exact words typed into the address bar,
you can clearly show that the user intended to navigate to the website,
or search for those terms, rather than accidentally clicked on a link.
• Values under the “HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\SOFTWARE” key are
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Figure 2.11: USBSTOR. Here you see an image of the USBSTOR registry
key. Immediately below USBSTOR are 3 keys named for device types, and
under those keys there are subkeys for the specific instances of those
devices, named with their serial number.
usually created when programs are installed, but not always deleted
when the program is uninstalled. The values under the
“Microsoft\Windows \CurrentVersion\App Paths”
subkey of the “HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\SOFTWARE” hive can pro-
vide clues to potentially incriminating applications that had been in-
tentionally removed to evade detection.
The values under the
“Microsoft\Windows \CurrentVersion\Uninstall”
subkey of the “ HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\SOFTWARE” hive show
recently uninstalled applications.
Timestamps on these values can be used to corroborate timestamp
evidence from file system forensics, or detect tampering if there are
unexplained discrepancies.
2.4.5.2 Events Logs
In addition to the Registry, another very important source of computer foren-
sics evidence on Windows systems is the Event Log. Windows offers a log-
ging service to applications where they can register an event to be retained
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by Windows in the Event Logs. Applications generally log events for trou-
bleshooting and auditing purposes. The information in these events could
be important, but is irrelevant to the user under normal circumstances. The
more interesting event logs for a digital forensics investigator are usually those
created by the system itself. Much of the important evidence contained in
the event logs can also be found in the registry. Thus the event logs can be
used to corroborate evidence found in the registry, but perhaps more impor-
tantly, discrepancy between the event logs and registry is an indication of
evidence tampering.
Depending on the local security policy of the machine under investigation,
there may be more or less events tracked in the logs. By default, home
versions of Windows have most of their security auditing turned off, but
Windows servers have most of it turned on. So Windows event logs often
play an important role in investigating server-side incidents.
Before Windows Vista, the event logs were stored in a proprietary binary
format. Now they are stored in an XML format with reasonably detailed
public documentation. The event logs are now stored in files ending in the
“.evtx” extension. The Registry links the .evtx files to DLLs (Dynamic
Linked Libraries) containing message text, which together create the com-
plete event log presented by the event viewer. In Windows Vista and 7 there
are hundreds of event logs, each containing events listing date and time, user
account and computer, an event ID and a description of the event. The de-
scription is constructed from registry entries and related DLL files, so when
viewing an event log on a different system the descriptions might not be the
same. For example, if login event logging is enabled in the security audit
policy of the specific system in question, these events can be used to directly
tell which account was logged in at what time, and should be validated with
the registry items.
Since the event logs are not stored in simple plain text files, their forensic
examination can be a little tricky in some cases. There are third party tools
that can parse the .evtx files oﬄine (e.g. on Linux), but they won’t get
the complete picture without the corresponding registry entries and DLLs.
Security events are usually consistent within the same version of Windows
(i.e. the message DLLs are the same), but the application logs are likely to
have incompatible or missing message information because they depend on
the application DLLs.
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Figure 2.12: Login attempts. A classic example of an investigative use of
the Windows Event Logs is tracking login attempts. Here you can see the
security event log of a Windows 7 machine, with the log filtered to only
show logon/off events. You can see a string of several failed log on
attempts, which can be important information for an investigation,
particularly when correlated with other events.
If you are analyzing a live system, you can collect the logs before shutting
it down to guarantee the correct messages. If you are analyzing a “dead”
(powered down) system, then you can copy the event logs to another Win-
dows system of the same version to view the system events. However, if
there is an important event log for an application you do not have access to,
other than on the evidentiary machine, you can boot the forensic duplicate
in a virtual machine. The details of virtual machines are beyond the scope
of this course, but you can think of them as programs that pretend to be a
computer to allow a disk image to be loaded into a controlled environment.
If the evidentiary drive is loaded in a virtual environment, the application
DLLs will be available in this environment to view the full event logs.
2.4.5.3 Link files
Another potentially interesting source of evidence in a computer forensics
investigation is link files. Link files, or shortcuts, are files that point to other
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files. They are created by Windows automatically in various circumstances,
such as installing programs, but also track recently accessed folders. Link files
can be important for a computer forensics investigation because they contain
the full path to the file location and last accessed timestamps. The file path
obviously helps find the actual file on disk, but it’s especially important if
the file is on an external device or remote drive. The link file will contain the
full path with device serial number and volume label for the storage device
containing the file. The timestamps on the shortcut are important too. A
person might argue that a folder of illegal pictures was put on their computer
by a virus, but if there is a link on their desktop to the folder that was clicked
a few days ago, when the registry and log files indicate that they were logged
into the computer, they will have a harder time denying knowledge of the
files in court.
2.4.5.4 Recycle bin
Another interesting source of evidence on a Windows computer is the Recycle
Bin. The Recycle Bin is just another folder from the point of view of the
file system, but it is forensically interesting because of the misconceptions
people have of it. What most people consider “deleting” a file is really just
moving it to the Recycle Bin. What really happens when you click delete in
Windows is the file record’s file name and parent directory are updated.
There is a subdirectory in the Recycle Bin folder for each user account,
named with the account’s full security identifier. When a file is moved to
the recycle bin, it is given a new file name starting with “$R” followed by a
pseudorandom sequence of characters and the original file extension. There
is also a file created with filename starting with “$I” followed by the same
pseudorandom sequence of characters. This “$I” file contains original file-
name, the full path to the file’s original location, and it’s time of deletion.
This renaming solves the problem of multiple files with the same name from
different folders being sent to the recycle bin together, and the “$I” file allows
the files to be restored if desired.
The presence of a file in the recycle bin indicates that the user attempted
to delete the file. This can be significant legally if the file was relevant to the
investigation, because it could constitute attempted destruction of evidence.
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2.4.5.5 Sources
The primary sources for this lecture’s material were Eoghan Casey’s text-
books Digital Evidence and Computer Crime [28] and Handbook of Digital
Forensics and Investigation [29]. Other sources consulted were [30] and [31]
2.4.6 Lecture: Windows Application Analysis
In the last lecture we discussed some potential sources of evidence related to
the Microsoft Windows operating system. In this lecture, we will finish our
discussion of computer forensics by discussing some evidence sources related
to the applications running on Windows systems. It would be impossible to
completely cover this topic in a single lecture, but hopefully this discussion
will give you an idea of the wealth of information and potential evidence
that can be gained by forensic examination of applications, by presenting
specific examples and techniques that are particularly common and useful in
computer forensics investigations.
2.4.6.1 Application Metadata
To understand our remaining topics, it is important to know the difference
between application metadata and file system metadata. Recall from our
previous discussion that file system metadata is stored by NTFS in the file’s
file record. It includes timestamp and ownership information, but treats the
file’s contents as a black-box. For example, an image file would be treated
the same as a text document file. Unlike file system metadata, application
metadata is stored with the file’s actual contents, NOT in the file record.
Since the application metadata is defined by each application itself, it is
much more varied and often more detailed, and thus can contain a wealth of
information for a DF investigator.
Application timestamps can provide a more accurate view in some cases.
For example, if a file is copied to another device, it’s file system metadata
timestamps will likely be updated, showing the copy date as its creation date
and last write date. However the application metadata timestamps will re-
main unchanged, thus giving the creation date of the file itself and last write
date of its content. Note that both of these timestamps provide accurate,
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useful information, but they describe different events. When analyzing ap-
plication metadata, careful consideration must be paid to the circumstances
and rules for updating the values.
While application metadata for most files can be easily altered by widely
available tools, but it can be an excellent source of further leads in an inves-
tigation, and can still be useful as circumstantial evidence (to put pressure
on a suspect to confess, for example).
A ubiquitous and illustrative example of application metadata is that of
the Microsoft Office application suite. Office files have very rich application
metadata that can be a treasure trove for a digital forensics investigator.
Depending on the version and configuration, they can contain change records
(if track changes is used), the last ten authors to edit the document (Note an
“author” in Office is the name given to the application at time of installation),
hidden annotations and comments, and of course, created, last written, and
last accessed timestamps.
Another often important source of evidence from application metadata is
the EXIF tags stored in digital image file formats such as TFF and JPEG.
JPEG files actually contain an embedded TIFF file in their metadata, which
in turn contains the EXIF metadata. EXIF metadata contains creation date
and time, make and model of camera, camera settings (e.g. aperture, shutter
speed etc.), a preview thumbnail, descriptions, copyright. and sometimes
GPS coordinates. The GPS coordinates are only recorded if the camera is
GPS enabled and configured to “Geotag” its photos. This would be a very
restricting criteria, except that many iPhones and Android phones Geotag
by default.
2.4.6.2 Web Browser Forensics
One of the most important sources of evidence in a computer forensics inves-
tigation is the web browser. A web browser is an application for displaying
and navigating web pages. The browser sends a request to a web server for
a particular web page and the web server sends a collection of files that the
browser uses to construct the local version of the web page.
Web pages can have many different appearances, behaviors, and implemen-
tations, but typically they consist of a hypertext file and other supporting
resource files and scripts. A hypertext file is a normal plain text document,
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but with markup tags for formatting, dynamic behavior (e.g. html5), and
famously: hyperlinks. Hyperlinks are elements in hypertext that contain a
URL (universal resource locator). They can point to other hypertext files,
images, or other websites. Most web pages contain dynamic content, built
by live interaction with the web server. This is important to a forensic in-
vestigation because the dynamic content cannot be reconstructed from the
local browser cache (at least not as easily as the static content). In general,
you can recover the files, but they will not look exactly the same as when
they were originally viewed by the user.
Browsers automatically store browsing history and cache viewed web pages.
In Internet Explorer, browser history is organized in binary “index.dat” files
that must interpreted by a forensics tool to be useful. These index.dat files
also list the file location of the web page files downloaded by the browser
in the “Temporary Internet Files” folder. You can reconstruct the browsing
session from the cache, but it will not contain any of the dynamic content
or server side scripts. This will enable you to partially reconstruct the users
browsing activity. In Windows 7, the
“C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\
Temporary Internet Files\Low\Content\IE5\index.dat”
file contains browsing history with every file in cache listed along with
browsing event that generated it. The
“C:\Documents and Settings\<username>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\
Windows\History\History.IE5\index.dat”
file lists the browsing history without all the cached files.
2.4.6.3 Email
Another potentially important source of evidence in a computer forensics
investigation is email. Email messages are exchanged and stored by mail
servers. Users interact with mail servers through mail clients or their web
browser. Email works just like regular mail. The email server is analogous to
the post office and your email client is analogous to your mailbox. To send
mail you just write it and put it in the mailbox (click send) and the protocol
takes care of the rest.
There are several different protocols used to make email work. There are
different protocols used by mail servers to communicate with each other,
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but for our discussion, we are concerned with the protocols clients use to
communicate with the mail server.
• The simplest, and probably closest to physical mail, is the POP3 pro-
tocol. In POP3, your email client retrieves the email and it is deleted
from the mail server.
• The IMAP protocol is different. The client reads the mail from the
server, but does not delete it, until explicitly instructed to by the user.
This would be like you going to the post office to get your mail, and
bringing back copies, but leaving the originals.
• The third option is most likely what most of you use for your per-
sonal email: webmail. In webmail, there is no email client, just a web
browser. The browser connects to a web page (e.g. mail.google.com)
and communicates as it would with a normal web page.
For computer forensics, we are concerned with finding the email archives.
The email archive is the local repository for the client’s email messages.
Depending on the type of client used, the location of the mail archives will
be different, and they may not be stored on the computer at all. If they are
stored on the local machine, they are usually found under the
“C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\”
folder in Windows. For example, the email archive for the “Thunderbird”
email client on Windows 7 is located at
“C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Thunderbird\Profiles
\<profilename>\Mail\Inbox”
The format of email archive files is usually plain text, and they can be
viewed in a text editor. However, there are more advanced techniques and
tools available for email forensics. Viewing even a small number of emails in a
text editor is awkward and slow. There exist tools that take advantage of the
index and table of contents files (depending on the client) to display the email
in a more user friendly, easily navigable way. Most commercial forensics suits,
like EnCase, can process email inboxes from every major client. Generally,
email attachments are stored in-line with the rest of the email data, so can
be recovered by a tool, or manually with a little manipulation.
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2.4.6.4 Installed programs
Currently installed and recently removed programs can be an important clue
during an investigation. Aside from the obvious case where you find pirated
software or other illegal programs, traces of legal software that can be used
for anti-forensics and evidence tampering is a good indication that you should
be on the lookout for tampering, double checking your timestamps and evi-
dence sources whenever possible. Often the primary benefit of knowing what
programs are or were installed on a machine is not to directly give evidence
of a crime, but determine what the machine is used for. For example, if you
find only typical office applications like Microsoft Word and Excel, then you
are probably dealing with a work computer; if you find applications related
to hobbies, such as video games, then you are probably dealing with a per-
sonal computer. Perhaps none of these applications are illegal or used for
illegal activities, but knowing what the computer is used for in general can
guide your investigation.
As mentioned briefly in the previous lecture, installed programs are listed
under the registry key
“HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows
\CurrentVersion\App Paths”,
and recently uninstalled programs are located under the registry key
“HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows
\CurrentVersion\Uninstall”.
You may also find evidence by searching allocated and/or unallocated space
for the executable’s file name, if known. If no attempt has been made to con-
ceal the application, it will simply be listed under program files. Examining
the creation and access times of the executable files can give installation
and last execution times, respectively. These should be compared to the
timestamps of the corresponding registry keys, if available, to detect possi-
ble tampering. You can sometimes also find traces of deleted applications
configuration and temporary data under
“C:\Documents and Settings\<username>\Application Data”,
“C:\Documents and Settings\<username>\local Settings
\Application Data”,
“C:\Users\<username>\AppData”,
and “C:\ProgramData”.
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Often uninstall/cleaning utilities are sloppy in cleaning up these auxiliary
folders, so evidence can remain long after the files in unallocated space have
been overwritten and the registry entries removed. Note that there is an
additional difficulty in implicating a specific person with this method. Pro-
grams that were installed by another user, but configured to be accessible to
everyone will show up as installed under all users’ directories.
There is another source of information on installed programs, and the fact
that it is little known is sometimes forensically important. Prefetch files are
used by Windows to expedite the start up of recently executed files. They are
stored in the “C:/Windows/Prefetch” directory, and all have the extension
“.pf”. These files contain the path to the executable, the last run time, the
number of times run from that location, and the names of the DLLs (external
libraries) the executable requires. At most 128 prefetch files are stored at any
one time, and they are retained based on most recently used. Thus, prefetch
files give you an indication of what programs the user frequently used, in
addition to their last executed times. Since they are less well known, and
therefore less likely to be modified by a user attempting to hide evidence,
they can be valuable to corroborate findings from other sources.
2.4.6.5 Sources
The primary sources for this lecture’s material were Eoghan Casey’s text-
books Digital Evidence and Computer Crime [28] and Handbook of Digital
Forensics and Investigation [29]. Other sources consulted were [30], [32], [33],
[34], and [35].
2.5 Module: Forensic Psychology
In this section I present a brief summary of the material from the two lectures
covering forensic psychology. The instructor and subject matter expert for
this module was Professor Masooda Bashir.
The overall purpose of this module is to give students a basic familiarity
with the field of criminal psychology, particularly focusing on cyber crime
and the psychological profiling of cyber criminals.
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2.5.1 Key Concepts
• Forensic psychology is broadly defined as the application of the science
of psychology to assist legal investigations or proceedings. A more
concrete understanding of the field can be gained by considering some
common roles and responsibilities of forensic psychologists:
– Psychological Disorders and Offender Assessment
– Punishment, Rehabilitation, and Assignment
– Interviewing Suspects and Detecting Deception
– Witness Evidence
– Police Psychology
– Decision-making Strategies of Juries
– Crime Prevention and Cyber-Crime Victims
– Research
– Psychological Profiling
• Criminal profiling is the art and science of predicting the likely charac-
teristics and future behavior of a suspect based on known case evidence
and previous related cases. This lecture presents and compares both
the inductive (attempt to match case evidence to pre-existing profile or
template) and deductive (develop profile based on case evidence only)
processes for building psychological profiles.
2.6 Module: Network Forensics
In this section, I present a brief summary of the material from the six lectures
covering network forensics. The instructor and subject matter expert for this
module was Dr. Faisal Syed.
The purpose of this module is to give students a high level overview of
the field of network forensics, focusing on the principles underlying practice,
rather than memorization of standard procedures.
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2.6.1 Key Concepts
• Networking Fundamentals : This module begins with a brief review
of some basic computer networking fundamentals, principally includ-
ing basic network components, the OSI abstraction model, and basic
TCI/IP protocol operation.
• Network Evidence Acquisition: This module also introduces some basic
techniques for acquiring evidence from network devices. The volatil-
ity of many types of network based evidence makes their acquisition a
strategic as well as technical challenge. Based on his or her current in-
formation, a network forensics investigator must prioritize their search
for evidence based on both its expected importance and lifespan. Ad-
ditionally, since network forensics investigation is often carried out on
live networks, the investigators must take care to minimize disruption
in the operation of the systems.
• Packet Analysis : This module also introduces some basic techniques
for extracting evidence from captured packet data. Specifically, tech-
niques for analyzing the protocol header fields, decoding and analyzing
the protocols within packets, aggregating packets into streams, and
reconstructing higher layer protocols’ data from these streams.
• Statistical Flow Analysis : This module also presents an overview of
statistical flow analysis, which gathers evidence about network events
by considering aggregate statistics of flow records. Flow records gen-
erally contain the source, destination, start time, stop time, and data
volume of each flow.
• Network Intrusion Detection and Analysis : This module also includes
a brief introduction to Network Intrusion Detection Systems, including
their basic operation and how they can be used in a network forensics
investigation.
2.7 Module: Fraud Investigation
In this section, I present a brief summary of the material from the two lectures
covering fraud examination. The instructor and subject matter expert for
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this module was Professor Frank Nekrasz.
This module introduces the basic concepts of fraud investigation, to show
students a different type of investigation in which digital evidence often plays
a critical role.
2.7.1 Key Concepts
• Fraud : For the purposes of this work, let fraud be defined as follows
“Fraud is any intentional act or omission designed to deceive others,
resulting in the victim suffering a loss and/or the perpetrator achieving
a gain [36].”
• Introduction to Fraud Examination: Fraud examination is the method-
ology of investigating an allegation of fraud. It involves all stages of the
investigation, including collection and analysis of evidence, interview-
ing witnesses and potential suspects, writing investigating reports, and
providing expert testimony. A fraud examiner is unlikely to be a digi-
tal forensics expert, but a digital forensics expert is often an important
member of the fraud examination team.
• Benford’s Law : One of the most important investigative techniques
covered in this module uses Benford’s Law: the principle that the dis-
tribution of digits in naturally occurring numbers follows a predicable,
non-uniform distribution; where the first digits of numbers are much
more likely to be lower valued (e.g. 1’s and 2’s) than higher valued (e.g.
8’s and 9’s). These distributions are found to hold quite accurately
for real financial data, but when fraudsters alter numbers in financial
documents, they rarely do so carefully enough to avoid upsetting the
distribution of digits. Thus, a fraud examiner can often detect fraudu-
lent financial records by computing the expected distribution of digits
for a given financial document, and comparing it to the distribution
present in the document.
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2.8 Module: Mobile Device Forensics
This section presents the material for the mobile device forensics module in
narrative form4.
Mobile device forensics is the sub-discipline of digital forensics that deals
with preservation, extraction, analysis, and investigation of digital evidence
from mobile devices. Since they are by far the most common application of
mobile device forensics skills, our discussion will focus on cell phones, but
many of the same concepts and techniques can be applied to other mobile
devices such as GPS navigation units.
While it has historically received very little focus in digital forensics ed-
ucation and training, mobile device forensics skills are becoming more and
more important to a well rounded digital forensics professional for several
key reasons.
• Almost everyone has a cell phone these days, so almost every case has
a potential use for mobile device forensics.
• These devices are more strongly bound to a person’s identity than a
computer, because they are almost never shared between multiple users.
• It is more difficult to hide mobile evidence, since users do not typically
have low level access to the device, and the underlying systems are
esoteric and difficult to understand.
• Evidence from mobile devices can be corroborated with evidence from
the service provider and computers the device was tethered to, increas-
ing confidence in both.
• Mobile device evidence has rich location information, made all the more
useful because most people always have their cell phone with them.
2.8.1 Lecture: Mobile Device Forensics I
In this lecture, we are going to begin our discussion of mobile device forensics,
focusing on the evidence that can be acquired from the physical device, rather
4This section is presented in narrative form, so the second person (e.g. “you”) indicates
the students and the first person (e.g. “I”) indicates the instructor.
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than the network. We will briefly review some technology fundamentals,
discuss flash memory and how it effects mobile device forensics investigations,
and give a brief overview of the types of evidence that can be acquired from
mobile phones.
2.8.1.1 Mobile Device Technology Fundamentals
Mobile devices are basically just miniature computers, with a CPU, RAM,
and persistent storage (flash memory instead of hard disk). But to allow
self-sufficient, mobile operation, they also typically have a battery, keypad,
screen, and radio communication chip.
Mobile phones are often divided into two categories based on their general
capabilities: Baseline phones, and “smartphones.” The defining difference
between a smartphone and a baseline phone is the ability to install third
party applications. Thus, while baselines phones can only be used to a few
standard functions such as text messaging and voice communication, smart-
phones can do almost anything a conventional computer can. Commonly the
only limitation on a smartphone’s capabilities (other than physical limita-
tions like processing power, RAM, storage, and battery life), is the operation
system enforced requirement that the applications be “signed” (i.e. crypto-
graphically endorsed) by the vendor of the operating system (e.g. Android
Play Store, or Apple App Store). This restriction can be, and often is, by-
passed if the user uses a security exploit to “Jailbreak” or “Root” the device.
We will cover the potential investigative benefits of this ubiquitous network
connectivity in next week’s lecture on mobile network forensics, but today
we will consider the consequences of this connectivity for a local examination
of a device. Phones are often referred to as GSM devices or CDMA devices
depending on the type of network communication chip they have. This dif-
ference is separate from the categorization of mobile network communication
standards into so called “generations” according to access speed. Unlike gen-
eral computers, mobile devices usually have a globally unique identification
number. GSM devices each have a unique IMEI number (International Mo-
bile Equipment Identity), and CDMA devices have a unique ESN number.
Most devices will also have a manufacturer specified serial number. These
identifiers can be important for a digital forensics investigation, because they
serve to reliably identify a device, even if all the device data has been lost.
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To access a GSM network, a device must also have a SIM (Subscriber
Identity Module) card. SIM cards are actually tiny computers that have their
own processor, RAM, and ROM (Read Only Memory, for persistent storage).
This allows them to do relatively secure cryptographic authentication with
the GSM network, without ever transferring the device’s secret keys outside
the SIM card. This is an important property, without which the SIM card
could be easily copied by criminals who could then impersonate legitimate
users for free network communication or concealing other criminal activities.
SIM cards also contain a unique ICC-ID and subscriber identifier (IMSI) that
can be used to distinguish them regardless of what phone they happen to be
plugged into.
For context in our following discussion, it may be helpful to introduce some
common mobile device operating systems. The most common smartphone
operating systems are
• Android : an open source mobile operating system based on the Linux
kernel.
• iOS : a proprietary mobile operating system for the Apple iPhone and
other Apple mobile devices.
• Windows Phone: a lightweight, mobile version of the proprietary Mi-
crosoft Windows operating system.
• BlackBerry : a proprietary mobile operating system for BlackBerry de-
vices.
By contrast, baseline phones often have simple proprietary operating sys-
tems and file systems developed in-house by the manufacturer. Many of these
have been reverse engineered by forensics experts and can be processed by
specialized mobile device forensics tools, but are difficult to interpret without
such tools.
2.8.1.2 NAND Flash Memory
Unlike traditional computers which generally use fragile magnetic disks for
persistent storage, mobile phones usually use some kind of more durable
NAND flash memory for their non-volatile storage. NAND flash memory
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uses the same physical mechanisms for storing data as Solid State Drives,
and suffers from the same restrictions: data can only be erased in blocks and
repeated writes damage memory cells.
For our purposes, the most important difference between NAND flash and
SSDs is in the implementation of the Flash Translation Layer (FTL). The
Flash Translation Layer (FTL) is the mechanism that handles garbage col-
lection, wear leveling, and mapping from logical file structure to data layout
in physical memory. SSDs are a type of managed NAND flash, because their
FTL is handled by a smart controller on the flash device itself. The NAND
flash chips on most mobile devices are raw NAND flash, because they only
have a Program/Erase/Read (P/E/R) controller on the NAND flash device
itself, and the FTL must be implemented in the file system and executed by
the host device. This distinction has two important consequences for mobile
device forensics:
1. The mapping from the logical location of the data (analogous to the
“Cluster Address” from NTFS), to the actual data location on the
memory chip is implemented in the mobile device, not the chip itself.
2. Garbage collection is much less likely to destroy deleted files. De-
pending on the implementation, the garbage collection process (erasing
blocks marked as not in use) may only occur when data is written to
the chip, or at least only when the operating system is loaded and the
file system has been mounted.
The result of these two facts is that if you take what is called a “physical”
image of the flash memory (to be covered in more detail later), bypassing the
file system and directly reading the flash memory contents, the data returned
will contain deleted file contents and will also be very difficult to interpret,
because parts of files may be scattered depending on how the wear leveling
was carried out.
2.8.1.3 Example Flash File System: YAFFS2 [37]
To solidify your understanding of these points, I will describe the basic op-
eration of YAFFS2 (Yet Another Flash File System version 2). YAFFS2 is
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Figure 2.13: Example YAFFS2 memory unit sizes with two pages per
chunk. This figure shows the relationship between pages, chunks, and blocks.
Figure 2.14: Simplified example of a file update operation in the YAFFS2
log-structured file system. The state of the “Physical Memory Contents”
resulting from the file modification is shown.
used by a variety of devices, but most notably by Android smartphones. It
was designed from the ground up to efficiently utilize NAND flash memory.
The basic unit of allocation of NAND flash as a called a page. That is to
say, the flash memory you can assign to a file must be an integer number of
pages (analogous to the sector for a magnetic disk). YAFFS2 defines its basic
unit of allocation as a chunk. That is to say, the flash memory YAFFS2 can
assign to a file must be an integer number of chunks. A chunk is typically
simply 1 page, but it can be defined as multiple pages if required (analogous
to the clusters for NTFS). As we discussed with SSDs, data in NAND flash
can only be erased in blocks. Typically 32 to a few hundred chunks form a
block.
Since flash memory does not allow overwriting of data without erasing the
entire block, if a file is modified, you must allocate new chunks to store the
changes. However, it would be very inefficient to copy the entire file’s contents
every time this happens, so YAFFS2 uses what’s called a “log structure”.
Specifically, what YAFFS2 actually stores in the flash memory is a sequence
of log entries specifying changes made to the files. Thus the order in which
a file’s data chunks are stored is based on the last time that particular part
of the file was modified, not the actual ordering of the files contents.
Consider the example in figure 2.14. A file consisting of 3 chunks is saved
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after modifying the second chunk’s data. The modified chunk is written
sequentially after the previously stored data in the log-structured file sys-
tem, rather than overwriting the old chunk two data as NTFS would have
done. This is obviously an extremely simplified overview of the operation of
YAFFS2, and these chunks would be marked with sequence numbers and var-
ious metadata objects (not shown) to allow the file system to determine which
chunks store the current file contents, but it illustrates two very important
points about YAFFS2 (that are generally true of most flash file systems):
1. The physical contents of flash memory are often very difficult to inter-
pret manually, requiring special tools to make sense of them.
2. As you can see, the chunks containing the old version of the file (with
“Chunk two data”) have not been overwritten, and are unlikely to be
anytime soon, since the still current “Chunk one data” and “Chunk
three data” are stored in the same block (much larger than a chunk).
Thus YAFFS2 (and in general any log structured file system) leaves not
just deleted files, but a very thorough record of many previous changes
to a file.
As mentioned previously, the garbage collection in raw NAND flash must
be implemented in the file system. The behavior of the garbage collector is
of particular interest for mobile device forensics; I will describe the YAFFS2
implementation briefly to illustrate. The YAFFS2 garbage collector operates
in one of two modes based on the number of free blocks available.
1. Passive: When it is not short on free blocks, it operates in passive
mode. In passive mode, the garbage collector finds blocks with no in-
use chunks or very few in-use chunks, and moves any in-use chunks to
other blocks before erasing the block.
2. Aggressive: When free blocks become scarce, the garbage collector
switches to aggressive mode. In aggressive mode, it selects more blocks
with more in-use chunks, consolidates the in-use chunks in new blocks,
and erases the old blocks.
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2.8.1.4 Types of Evidence
Mobile devices offer a variety of evidence that can be very valuable for an
investigation. Some of the most commonly useful types of mobile device
evidence deserve special mention.
Call records are very useful since they provide exact times when individuals
talked, and how long they talked. They are also very reliable, because they
can be corroborated with records stored by the provider. The disadvantage
is that they don’t provide any direct information about WHAT was said.
SMS messages are particularly useful since they contain a full transcript
of the conversation, and their timestamps are reliable, since they are added
by the network provider, rather than the phone. The disadvantage of SMS
messages is that they do not record when the user actually READ the mes-
sage, only when the phone received it, and whether it had been subsequently
opened. So they give time windows, such as “Bob became aware of X some-
time between the time his phone received the message and when he replied
to it.”
Address books provide a convenient source of one of the most important
types of investigative evidence: peoples’ associates. This is especially critical
in large investigations involving many individuals, such as organized crime.
Smartphones contain a wealth of potential evidence in media files (image,
audio, video), GPS waypoints, email, Internet history, social network ac-
counts, and potentially suspicious third-party applications. For example, the
application “TigerText” is used to provide a secret text messaging service
that can’t be observed by the provider.
If a warrant can be obtained, the service provider also retains very useful
location and usage information. For example, providers will typically record
which cell towers the phone accessed at what times, which will give you an
approximate movement history of the phone.
2.8.1.5 Sources
The primary source for this lecture’s material was Eoghan Casey’s textbook
Handbook of Digital Forensics and Investigation [38].
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2.8.2 Lecture: Mobile Device Forensics II
In this lecture, we will continue our discussion on mobile device forensics
from last time. Today we will focus on preservation and acquisition of mobile
device evidence, as these are the areas where mobile device forensics most
differs from computer forensics.
2.8.2.1 Proper Handling of Evidentiary Mobile Devices
As with conventional computer forensics, steps should be taken to secure,
evaluate, and document the scene before any evidence is collected. The same
basic principles we discussed earlier apply to handling mobile device evi-
dence. A complete chain of custody should be documented, only individuals
with proper training should handle digital evidence, and care should be taken
to prevent alteration of the evidence. However, to prevent alteration of the
evidence, additional precautions need to be taken for mobile devices. Specif-
ically the devices need to be isolated from the network. If the device is not
isolated from the network, it will continue to receive communications that
may alter or overwrite evidence on the device. The most damaging possibil-
ity is a remote wiping service. Many device manufacturers offer the option
to send a command to the device over the network that will cause it to delete
all its data, and thus much evidence.
2.8.2.2 Proper Network Isolation
To isolate a device from the network, you can remove the battery from the
device (turning it off is not always sufficient), but it is often not desirable to
turn mobile devices off, since forensic analysis of mobile devices is much more
dependent on live analysis that computer forensics, as we will see later. The
preferred method for network isolation is to place the device in a “Faraday
cage” (typically a small bag lined with conductive material). A Faraday
cage is a container that prevents any electromagnetic waves (including radio
waves) from entering or leaving it. Note that once the device has been stored
in the Faraday cage, it will continuously try to reconnect to the network,
draining its battery very quickly. Thus to prevent loss of the evidence in
the device memory, it is important to bring the device to the forensics lab
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as soon as possible. Once in the lab, it should be take to a special room
that is Faraday isolated and plugged in to a charger to keep it from dying.
If no Faraday isolation bag is available, then placing the device in “airplane
mode” is a common alternative, but this is not preferable because it requires
interacting with the device’s user interface. What is actually done in practice
often depends on the available equipment as well as the regulations / standard
practices for the organization acquiring the device. If the device is low on
battery life, and you don’t have a portable charger / battery pack, may
be preferable to put it in airplane mode rather than a Faraday cage. If you
don’t have any Faraday isolated containers, obviously your choices are limited
to turning the device off or putting it in airplane mode. Some standard
practices differ depending on the type of device. For example, iPhones have
mandatory hardware encryption of their NAND flash, so evidence must either
be acquired using their file system interface, or the decryption keys must be
recovered from RAM somehow. It is also important to find any removable
media, such as MicroSD cards, and properly catalog and store them. This
should be done in the lab, not at the scene.
Note: there is some disagreement in the literature and federal guidelines
about whether it is better to turn a device off or place it in a Faraday
cage [39], [40]. I present here the point of view that it is preferable to use
the Faraday cage, because most criticisms of it revolve around the battery
draining problem, which simply results in the phone shutting itself down, the
same result as if you took the alternative and shut it down yourself.
2.8.2.3 Data Acquisition Layers
What is considered “best practice” is much less well defined for mobile device
forensics than computer, or even network forensics. This is because unlike
traditional computers, which generally use one of several well known operat-
ing systems, file systems, and hardware interfaces with well documented and
often open source specifications, mobile devices usually use specialized, pro-
prietary operating systems and file systems with special hardware interfaces.
As a result, it is much more difficult to acquire evidence from mobile devices
in a standardized, forensically sound manner. The techniques required vary
widely based on the type and manufacturer of the device, but I will attempt
to give you an idea of the general practices. Depending on the type and
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manufacturer of the device, some of the techniques we will cover may not be
possible, but even if they are, time considerations may prevent an investiga-
tor from using the most thorough and rigorous methods. Here I will give you
an introduction to the general techniques for extracting information from
mobile devices, sorted from fastest and least rigorous to slowest and most
rigorous. As with computers, it is generally not advisable to operate directly
on the evidentiary device, but there is not a universally accepted “correct”
way to make a forensic duplicate of a mobile device.
The Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence defines seven levels of
access for mobile devices.
1. Manual operation: The easiest but least forensically rigorous method
is to simply interact with the device through its user interface. This
will inevitably result in alteration of the device’s state, and only al-
lows access to the data retrievable by the operating system. While this
method may result in the loss of hidden data or deleted files, it is suf-
ficient to retrieve the most common and important types of evidence,
such as SMS message transcripts, call history, contacts, and installed
applications. Also, this method will update the file system and appli-
cation level access history and timestamps for everything you touch, so
potentially important evidence such as if/when a user last accessed an
application will be lost. This method is only possible if you can access
the user interface, bypassing any security measures such as pass-codes,
however it is usually very easy to circumvent the user level security on
most phones. This process should be videotaped or photographed to
at least ensure proper documentation.
2. Logical acquisition: A more forensically rigorous and time consuming
method is so called “logical acquisition.” Techniques in this category
basically involve connecting to a communication port on the device
and sending special commands to the operating system instructing it
to output various pieces of information. Which of these techniques
is possible and what data they can access is entirely dependent on the
type of device and manufacturer and varies widely. You are restricted to
only those commands supported by the operating system, and since the
source code of these operating systems is generally not available, it is
not possible to guarantee the integrity of the data returned, or that they
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do not alter the state of the phone. An alternative methods for logical
acquisition is a so called “Software Agent,” a program which, when
copied to the device and executed, will output all operating system
accessible files (i.e. no deleted files).
3. File System Access : On some devices is is possible to acquire the en-
tire contents of the file system, that is to say, every file the operating
system can access, through a communication port. This depends on
operating system and device driver support, but if available, it gives a
very thorough but still easily readable view of the system. The down-
side to this method is that you are restricted to those files within the
file system that the operating system can access. This excludes hidden
areas, and depending on the way the device’s operating system and
file system handle them, deleted files. The distinction between logical
and file system access can be a bit confusing; we will consider a logical
acquisition to be essentially a partial file system acquisition, depending
on the capabilities of the specific acquisition method.
4. Physical acquisition (Non invasive): On some devices, it is possible
to acquire the entire contents of RAM and non-volatile flash memory
through the communication port or some proprietary interface. This
method is very thorough and won’t alter the device data, but the in-
terpretation of the resulting binary file is quite difficult without a doc-
umented format (which is almost never available). The main benefit
of physical acquisition is that it gets deleted files. Depending on the
type of flash memory and file system used, often many deleted files are
available. Another method used by some forensics tools to gain ac-
cess to the full RAM and non-volatile flash memory is a bootloader. In
this method, the forensics tool uses a security vulnerability to interrupt
the device’s startup process before the operating system is loaded, and
insert a custom program that outputs the physical image of the device.
5. Physical acquisition (invasive): It is also often possible to acquire a
full copy of the entire contents of RAM and non-volatile flash using
the device’s JTAG port. JTAG is a standard protocol for debugging
integrated circuits which allows a skilled (and very patient) user to
arbitrarily access and edit the device memory and CPU state, and
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it is enabled on most phones. This process will also allow you to re-
cover deleted files. However, accessing the JTAG shift registers requires
opening the device casing (and sometimes partially disassembling the
device) and attaching leads to the internal circuit board. It also re-
quires you to know which system processor and memory circuits are
used and how they are connected on the system bus. You also need to
know the location and functional mapping of the JTAG test points on
the printed circuit board, the protocol for reading and writing memory,
and the correct voltages to apply to the test points. As you can prob-
ably guess, this is not the most convenient process, and the resulting
data will still need to be interpreted based on a, probably unknown,
standard format. So, this is generally not done unless absolutely nec-
essary.
6. Chip-off access : You can physically remove the flash memory chips
from the device’s circuit board and use custom hardware to directly
read their contents. This method also allows you to recover deleted
files. With this method it is always technically possible to read the
contents of the device flash memory, but the device is permanently
damaged and cannot be reassembled. Also, the contents of RAM are
not acquired, and if the flash memory is encrypted, which is often the
case, then you can’t learn anything from it.
7. Micro Read : In the case where the phone has been physically damaged
to the extent that the flash memory chips are partially destroyed, it is
still possible to recover data by using an electron microscope to read the
charge state of the individual flash memory cells. These microscopes
are extremely expensive and are only available in a few digital forensics
and research labs, so this type of analysis would only be undertaken for
investigations of the most extreme importance (e.g. national security).
A common practice is to use a combination of methods: starting with
a more forensically rigorous method (e.g. physical acquisition), and then
performing a quick analysis by logical acquisition or manual operation. Thus,
the original state of the device is preserved as much as possible, and the
manual operation can be used to quickly find any “low-hanging fruit.” The
more rigorous evidence record can be used to verify the integrity of important
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evidence discovered through the manual operation. The time consuming
processes of exhaustive examination of the entire physical image of the device
is rarely necessary.
There are various specialized digital forensics tools for mobile devices. Un-
like computer and network forensics tools that typically all implement most
the same functionality and distinguish themselves by their efficiency or ease
of use, mobile device forensics tools are often very specialized and have very
diverse capabilities. No one tool can be used for every device type.
2.8.2.4 Acquisition and Examination of SIM Cards
Sim cards contain several useful sources of evidence, as we discussed last
time. Specifically, SIM cards contain the unique IDs for the SIM card and
the user’s account with the provider, an abbreviated contact list, and possibly
SMS messages and recent call records. SIM cards have a standard format for
storing their files, and several tools will automatically extract it (e.g. Forensic
Card Reader, The Forensic SIM Toolkit, SIMCon, SIMIS, USIMdetective).
SIM cards may be secured with a PIN to restrict access. Brute forcing this
PIN can be problematic because the SIM card will lock after several (usually
3) failed attempts, but it is usually easy to get the unlock code from the
network service provider.
2.8.2.5 Sources
The primary source for this lecture’s material was Eoghan Casey’s textbook
Handbook of Digital Forensics and Investigation [38]. Other sources include
[41], [40], [39], and [42].
2.8.3 Lecture: Mobile Network Forensics
In this lecture, I will briefly introduce some common digital forensics tech-
niques for extracting evidence from mobile networks. In addition to provid-
ing useful supporting evidence for the type of investigations we have been
focusing on so far, mobile network forensics techniques are often critical to
coordinating investigation of large scale cases such as those involving inter-
national crime rings and terrorism. With the proper authorization, investi-
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gators can gain access to the mobile network service provider’s systems to
extract evidence about the activities of suspects in real time. These tech-
niques are closely related to wiretapping, and have similarly ambiguous legal
restrictions and ethical considerations, that are important to keep in mind
during an investigation. We will also introduce several useful techniques for
investigative analysis, the final step in a digital forensics investigation before
reporting.
2.8.3.1 Mobile Network Technology
Mobile networks are fundamentally based on radio frequency communica-
tions. This means that all devices within an area share the same physical
transmission channel: the frequency band allocated for the mobile network.
Mobile networks can be broadly categorized based on the way they allocate
access to this shared transmission channel:
• Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) breaks transmission signal into
multiple discrete time slots for each device and take turns using the
shared channel.
• Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) multiplexes different device
signals into a one signal that is transmitted over the shared physical
channel. The original signals are extracted from the shared signal using
a code shared between the sender and receiver.
Mobile devices connect to the nearest Base Transceiver Station (BTS)
over a radio link using TDMA or CDMA. The geographical region covered
by a single BTS is called a cell. The company that operates this radio
communication infrastructure is called the Network Service Provider (NSP).
2.8.3.2 Types of Mobile Network Evidence
Mobile network forensics allows for the easy acquisition of several very useful
types of evidence:
• Localization parameters : information about the current or past loca-
tions of a mobile device
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• Usage logs / Billing records : the NSP’s internal business records of all
the network activity of a device
• Text / Multimedia messages : NSP’s often retain transient copies of
text and multimedia messages on their servers
• Intercepted data: with proper authorization, investigators can intercept
and record any communication over the mobile network
2.8.3.3 Localization Techniques
Probably the most important type of evidence gathered from mobile networks
is location information. Location information can be important for assessing
the alibis of suspects or whereabouts of victims. Mobile devices will connect
to the network automatically unless their networking functions are disabled
manually. Thus, they can be tracked by an investigator with access to the
provider network even if the user is not making calls or using the phone at
all.
The simplest and crudest way of tracking the location of a mobile device
is by identifying the cell (BTS coverage area) that the device is currently
connected to. This narrows the device location to the size of the cell, but
that size varies greatly, from 32 km in rural zones to a few hundred meters
in urban areas, depending on the density of BTS in the area.
This useful, but crude, estimate can be greatly improved by triangulation.
In Time Difference Of Arrival (TDOA) analysis (a.k.a. Multilateration),
the transmission latencies between the target device and several surrounding
base stations are measured and compared to triangulate its position. Note
that this requires three or more base stations to be within transmission range
of the device.
2.8.3.4 Usage Logs / Billing Records
Another important type of evidence available in mobile networks is the usage
logs of the NSP. Information contained in Call Detail Records (CDR) is
combined into logs and provided to investigators. These logs will generally
include the phone number of user, the phone numbers called, the IMEI/ESN
number of the device, cell information (coarse location), SMS messages sent
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(not including contents), date, time, and duration of calls, etc. While this
information is generally available on the devices themselves, getting it from
the NSP has several important advantages.
1. It would be extremely difficult for the mobile device’s user to tamper
with the NSP’s usage logs to hide evidence
2. The NSP logs can be seized as soon as legal authorization is received,
even while the mobile device’s user is still at large.
3. The NSP has strong business incentives to diligently maintain its usage
logs, while similar evidence on the mobile device will be progressively
overwritten to save space.
2.8.3.5 Intercepted Data
An important, and controversial, source of evidence available in mobile net-
works is traffic interception: the capture of information in transit by a third
party, using mechanical or electronic means, without the knowledge of the
parties engaged in a supposedly private communication.
In response to an authorized request (according to the relevant local laws)
by law enforcement, the NSP duplicates the suspect’s communication line and
directs it to a monitoring center (MC) operated by the investigators. This
monitoring center is typically composed of an interception server, which col-
lects and aggregates intercepted data, and clients that perform specific post-
processing steps and display the results. Investigators operating the client
machines get on-demand access to stored data and live conversations. These
interception systems typically also run an analytics platform that processes
all the unstructured data and allows for easier viewing and searching. For
example, querying “rifle” also returns documents containing “AK-47” and
querying “Larry Smith” will also return documents containing Larry’s phone
number.
Interception is a delicate topic, and frequently considered an invasion of
privacy, but legal under certain restrictions. There are many laws and regu-
lations designed to limit interception to protect individual privacy, but these
laws and regulations vary greatly by country and region / state.
91
2.8.3.6 Guidelines for Mobile Network Interception
A detailed state-by-state or country-by-country examination of the laws and
regulations governing traffic interception is beyond the scope of this course,
but a knowledge of some basic guidelines should give you an idea of how
interception can and cannot be used in an investigation.
Given the plethora of different network services and technologies provided
by various entities, it important to define specifically from whose systems the
data may be intercepted.
In general, Network Service Providers are required by law to retain certain
records and provide them to law enforcement when given a warrant. How-
ever, it is not entirely clear what technically qualifies as a “Network Service
Provider” and what records they are required to retain and provide.
While these definitions vary by state, there are some common qualifications
that would exempt an organization from having to facilitate interception.
• Those entities offering electronic communication services directly to a
limited group of people, rather than the general public, are generally
not required to maintain records of the usage of those services. For ex-
ample, a pottery club that runs a wireless network to give its members
access to a shared printer.
• Those whose operations do not generate or process the relevant traffic
data are not expected to retain it. For example, mobile phone man-
ufacturers, such as Motorola, are not required to retain a database of
call records from all their phones.
• Search engine administrators are, in some places, required to retain
and submit users search records to authorities on a properly authorized
request. This is a hotly debated issue. The search and browsing history
of users is in many cases qualified as “content” since it easily allows
reconstruction of exactly what the user was doing on the network, not
just who they were communicating with, and in most countries this
information is NOT required to be retained and is NOT subject to
seizure by the authorities. However, in the USA it generally is.
If an entity qualifies as an NSP, they must retain, for the exclusive purposes
of detecting and prosecuting crime, only the traffic data resulting from their
technical operations providing and billing services.
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Investigators also have their own set of obligations as to how intercepted
data must be acquired and handled:
• Investigators must protect the data they acquire (i.e. when they are
given private records, they are legally responsible for their continued
confidentiality).
• They must acquire data in such a way as its integrity can be verified.
• They must avoid inflicting undue cost on the parties involved.
• They must respect any relevant transnational legislature.
• They must use the current state of the art techniques.
2.8.3.7 Privacy and Interception
One of the biggest concerns with mobile network interception is limiting vio-
lation of citizens’ privacy. Many requirements have been enacted for technical
controls, operational oversight, and auditing in an attempt to reduce the risk
of abuse and detect any abuse quickly. Some example measures include:
• Authentication Systems must use “strong authentication” techniques
(i.e. 2 different authentication technologies required for access).
• There must be a strict separation of technical functions for operators
tasked with assigning credentials and those tasked with management
of the systems and databases.
• Traffic data retained for investigative purposes should be stored on
physically distinct systems from those used to process and store general
traffic data.
• In many countries, regulations require that data be retained for a lim-
ited period then deleted without delay, including copies created for law
enforcement in accordance with the law (not the USA though).
• An auditing system should be built into any system that operates on
private user data, to facilitate oversight.
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• All systems used for processing traffic should be thoroughly docu-
mented according to the accepted principles of software engineering.
This description must include not only the system architecture but
also the subjects or classes of subjects having legitimate access to the
system and the exact positions in the network where data is gathered
and processed.
• Confidentiality and integrity must be protected cryptographically by
ensuring intercepted data is never transmitted or stored unencrypted.
2.8.3.8 Reconstruction Techniques [43]
Reconstruction is the process of combining various evidence and general case
knowledge to form a picture of, or reconstruct, the past events relevant to
the case. This is the final phase of the investigative process before reporting,
and now that you have been introduced to some examination techniques and
various types of evidence, you should have an idea of what you will be using
to reconstruct events.
When attempting to reconstruct events, it is important to consider the
independence of evidence sources. Since digital evidence is frequently cir-
cumstantial, multiple sources must be corroborated to draw conclusions con-
fidently. However, two pieces of evidence should only be considered corrobo-
rating if they are drawn from independent events. In this context, “indepen-
dent” basically means neither event caused of the other.
We will introduce three general techniques for reconstructing events to
form useful intelligence.
1. Temporal analysis creates a timeline of events to help identify patterns
and gaps. It is good practice to plot important events on a timeline as
they are found, to organize information, make sure nothing is missed,
and guide the investigation. Such a timeline often used to tie multiple
sources of correlated information together into a single coherent picture,
and is well suited for cases where a relatively small number of entities
did many important things (i.e. ratio of important events to people
involved is high).
2. Relational analysis focuses on geographic and communication / asso-
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ciation relationships between important entities. This may be done
by plotting individuals locations on an explicit map, or constructing a
more abstract relationship graph. This type of graphical representation
is useful when trying to organize many separate sources of information
to reconstruct a complex event (i.e. the ratio of important events to
important people involved is low).
3. Functional analysis focuses on determining how a particular function or
program works, with the aim of understanding what it did under some
specific circumstances in the past. For example, reverse engineering an
unknown suspicious software package found on a phone to determine
if it is eavesdropping malware. This is useful in determining the tech-
nicalities of exactly what a device did, why it did it, and whether the
user was aware are important.
2.8.3.9 Sources
The primary source for this lecture’s material was Eoghan Casey’s textbook
Handbook of Digital Forensics and Investigation [44].
2.9 Module: Malware Forensics
This section presents the material for the malware forensics module in nar-
rative form5.
Malware forensics is a sub-discipline of digital forensics that deals with
the detection and analysis of malware.
Malware is a general term for software that performs some malicious func-
tion.
This course includes one lecture on malware, to familiarize the student with
the terminology and basic concepts of malware forensics. A more in-depth
treatment, examining the subtle science of reverse engineering malware and
designing countermeasures, is beyond the scope of this course.
5This section is presented in narrative form, so the second person (e.g. “you”) indicates
the students and the first person (e.g. “I”) indicates the instructor.
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2.9.1 Lecture: Malware Forensics
In this lecture we will present a brief taxonomy of malware and introduce
several common methods for malware detection. It is important for digital
forensics examiners to understand the fundamentals of malware propagation
and concealment techniques so they know the limitations of their detection
methods and can accurately determine the condition of a system with these
limitations.
The presence or absence, capabilities, and origin of malware are often
critical to establishing alibis and intent in an investigation. A DF examiner
should be appraised on the current state of the art in malware and anti-
malware design, so he or she can:
1. Find malware if present
2. Determine the malware’s origin
3. Determine the malware’s purpose and past activities
4. Argue competently that a system is free of malware if they find none
5. Prevent malware from damaging evidence during an investigation
Techniques for removing malware are of only tangential interest to a DF
examiner.
2.9.1.1 Types of Malware
There are many classifications and taxonomies of malware. We will discuss
two that will be useful in characterizing malware behavior and capabilities.
The first classification distinguishes malware by propagation mechanism:
the method they use to spread.
• Viruses propagate by “infecting” other files. The basic idea is that the
virus adds a copy of itself to the victim file, in such a way that the
virus code will be executed when the file is opened. Viruses use various
methods to evade detection:
– Encrypted virus : The virus code is encrypted using a different key
each time it is copied. Key and small decryption subroutine are
stored with virus
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– Polymorphic virus : Similar to an encrypted virus, but code “mu-
tates” every time it is copied, changing appearance (e.g. swap
order of independent instructions, change “2+2” to “5-1”, etc.).
The behavior of the virus does not change, and the part of the
code that does the “mutation,” the polymorphic engine, is not
itself mutated.
– Metamorphic virus : Like polymorphic virus but the code that
does the “mutation,” the metamorphic engine, is itself mutated.
• Worms propagate by exploiting vulnerabilities in software to gain unau-
thorized control over victim systems. Once the victim is infected,
worms may use concealment methods similar to viruses to avoid detec-
tion. In the 2000’s, worms were extremely prolific (e.g. SQL Slammer
infected 75,000 hosts in 10 minutes [45]).
Worms use many methods to gain access to victim machines. Some
examples:
– Email/IM: Worm sends itself as an attachment
– USB: Worm copies itself to a USB drive and infects autorun (op-
tionally)
– Remote transfer/execution: worm exploits vulnerabilities in net-
work services to gain access
– Remote login: worm logs in to remote server, transfers a copy of
itself, and executes the copy
– Drive-by downloads: worm is embedded in in a web page/script.
Exploits vulnerability in web browser
Modern worms are often “delivery vehicles” for other malware. That
is to say, the entire purpose of the worm is to download and install
other malware on the victim machines. This type of worm has become
known as a dropper.
• Trojans propagate using social engineering techniques to masquerade
as a useful program, thus tricking users into downloading and running
it. Once the trojan has been downloaded and installed, it’s behavior
generally falls into one of three categories:
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– Additional behavior : the trojan performs the function it advertised
to the user to get it download it, plus hidden malicious functions.
– Modified behavior : the trojan performs a modified, malicious ver-
sion of the advertised function.
– Replaced behavior : the trojan’s behavior is totally malicious and
unrelated to the advertised function.
The second classification distinguishes malware by payload : the actions
they take (other than propagation).
• System corruption payloads are designed to cause damage to the victim
system. This often takes the form of deletion or modification of impor-
tant files, or defacing a public website, as a prank or to show off. The
purpose of the payload was to publicly demonstrate that the system
was compromised. These types of attacks were more common in the
’90s and early 2000’s when cybercrime was less professionalized. More
often now these types of attacks are motivated by profit. Ransomware,
for example, encrypts users’ files and attempts to extort money from
them to get the decryption key. Some rather impressive malware has
even been employed to damage real-world facilities (e.g. the famous
“Stuxnet” malware that targeted the centrifuges in the Iranian nuclear
program).
• A Botnet is a collection of infected hosts, or bots, all controlled re-
motely by the botnet’s “owner” or by someone who paid the botnet
owner to rent the botnet. The payload of a botnet malware instructs
the victim to connect to the designated botnet controller and await
further instructions. Generally botnet malware tries to not disrupt the
victim machine, only “borrows” it when desired to perform designated
tasks en mass. Botnets are immensely useful because of their massive
compute/transmission power and their inherent anonymity.
– Sending spam
– Launching new worms quickly
– Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDOS): overload a victim
network with traffic
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– BitCoin mining
– Clickjacking: botnet owner hosts a website with ads that pay per
click. Makes his bots click them
– Manipulating online polls/games
– Brute forcing encryption/password hashes
• Information theft malware (keyloggers, phishing, spyware) is a notori-
ous and prolific malware payload type in the USA and western Europe.
These malware variants target several common types of information:
– Identity theft : important financial information is stolen such as
Credit card numbers, bank passwords, and Social Security Num-
bers, by logging keystrokes, for example.
– Spouseware is a new type of spyware marketed to suspicious spouses.
The suspicious spouse purchases the spouseware and installs it on
his or her partner’s device (typically smartphone) as if it were nor-
mal software. The spouseware eavesdrops on conversations, tracks
location, forwards emails and text messages, etc.
– Corporate or national espionage is a less common (but much more
exciting) application of information theft malware.
• Rootkit payloads are designed to maintain root access and avoid de-
tection. Since they have root privileged access to the system, rootkits
can do almost anything on the infected host, limited practically only
by the authors limited foreknowledge of what will be required to evade
detection. Some example methods used by rootkits to evade detection
are:
– Rootkits will intercept and modify calls to system functions during
scans.
– Some rootkits start up before the OS, and run the entire operating
system as a virtual machine.
– Some rootkits infect the motherboard’s BIOS, to place itself be-
tween the OS and the hardware platform.
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Note that these categorizations are orthogonal. So, for example, a worm
(propagation method) can be a keylogger (payload). The categories are not
mutually exclusive either. Some kinds of malware use multiple methods to
propagate based on their situation, and it is common for a malware payload
to have more than one function. Still, these categories are commonly used
when discussing malware, so it is important to understand what they mean.
2.9.1.2 Countermeasures
So far this all sounds quite dismal, but don’t despair, anti-malware technology
offers fairly robust countermeasures. There are four high level objectives one
could focus on when implementing malware countermeasures:
• Prevention: block the malware’s propagation mechanism. The ideal
goal, but also very difficult.
• Detection: determine with certainty whether a system has been com-
promised or not. Easiest to achieve, and least useful.
• Identification: determine the nature of a compromise if found, either
identifying a known malware or reverse engineering the behavior of a
new one.
• Removal : completely expiate all traces of the malware. This may be
more or less difficult depending on the malware, but it is always hard
to know if you succeeded.
2.9.1.3 Malware Scanners
The most common type of malware countermeasure is, of course, the ubiq-
uitous malware scanner or antivirus scanner. Modern antivirus suites are
fairly sophisticated systems, but they were built up incrementally from sim-
ple roots (no pun intended). I will present this explanation chronologically
based on succeeding “generations” of malware scanning techniques.
• First generation scanners use static signature matching to identify mal-
ware. This is the most obvious, simplest, and for many cases still the
most effective method of detecting malware.
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This type of scanning is fast, efficient, and easy to implementation. The
efficiency makes this the de-facto choice for scanning large collections
of data, and the simplicity means less development cost and software
bugs. However, it can only detect known malware variants, which
must contain a sufficiently rare, preferably unique, bit pattern in its
files. There are many ways for malware to exploit this weakness (e.g.
polymorphic viruses).
• Second generation scanners evaluate files based on heuristics (like rules-
of-thumb).
This is a slight improvement when used together with static signa-
ture scanning. Many of these heuristics are your kind of “Duct Tape”
solution to the encrypted virus and other early malware concealment
techniques. For example, to find a polymorphic virus, look for an en-
cryption key at the beginning of a loop, decrypt the file, and check it
against a static signature database to identify and remove it. These
heuristics are more difficult to implement than first generation scanners
and result in lots of false positives, however they are sometimes able
to detect previously unseen malware, and resist simple concealment
techniques like encrypted viruses and polymorphic viruses.
• Third generation scanners, also known as activity traps, identify a small
set of actions that indicate the start of some malicious activity. They
run in the background and monitor for these actions, and usually pre-
vents the action from continuing and prompt the user to examine the
activity and give explicit permission to override the alert. This pro-
tection is limited however, because individual actions are usually not
clearly malicious. It isn’t until several individual operating system
function calls have been executed that the overall intent becomes clear.
Thus, some damage may be done before the activity trap reacts and
blocks the malware. Third generation scanners don’t need a static sig-
nature for every malware type, only behavior patterns for the few types
of malicious activity malware typically engage in. They pay for this in
performance and convenience though. The program must always be
running in the background and may consume lots of resources. Also, if
the configuration and heuristics are not tuned carefully, it can result in
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many annoying false positive alerts, and users will habitually override
them, making the system useless.
• Fourth generation scanners use a combination of techniques in a com-
prehensive security suite usually including antivirus (signature/heuristic
scanner), firewall, access controls, activity trap, and generic decryption.
This is probably what most of you use. Common examples include Nor-
ton, Kaspersky, Avira, and Comodo.
Generic decryption is a technique for malware detection and contain-
ment that exploits the fact that poly/metamorphic malware must de-
crypt itself at some point before executing its payload. To determine
if an executable file contains malware, the generic decryption scanner
“simulates” the execution of the file and scans the resulting memory
space for known malware signatures. This “simulation” computes the
results of the instructions in the executable code, but it is carried out
entirely under the control of the generic decryption scanner, so the po-
tentially malicious file is never actually given control of the computer.
This scanner periodically pauses the simulation and scans the accumu-
lated simulated memory space for any traces of known malware. This
works great, but there are a couple major drawbacks: first, it only
works on known malware variants; and second, the malware will only
be detected if it decrypts its payload soon after execution begins and
without outside input. If the malware waits to decrypt its payload a
significant time after its execution, or waits for some external signal
before triggering, then the scanner will not detect it.
2.9.1.4 Dealing With Rootkits
A rootkit is a particular class of stealth malware that somehow gains supe-
ruser or “root” privileges on the infected host. A program with root privileges
can do almost anything on the host, including reading and modifying any
file, access to and control of the operating system’s utilities, and reading and
modifying the process execution state of other programs on the same host.
Heavy-handed application of these powers will quickly lead to system failures
and detection, but the primary theoretical limit on the power of an installed
rootkit is the ingenuity and foresight of its author.
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Rootkits are especially difficult to detect, and almost impossible to reliably
remove, because they can modify/control the very utilities that are attempt-
ing to find them. For example, a common technique for hiding rootkits is to
intercept the operating system API call that reads files, and if the requested
file is related to the rootkit, it simply returns nothing; with the end result
that the rootkit is “invisible” from any program running under the OS’s
supervision.
While they are generally more specialized and less reliable than the tech-
niques we have already discussed, there are methods capable of detecting
known rootkits. For example, to detect a rootkit employing the above tech-
nique you could scan the entire system using the operating system API calls,
then scan the entire system by directly interfacing with the hard drive, by-
passing the OS API calls. Thus if there is a rootkit intercepting OS API calls
that read its files, the two scan results produced will be different. Note that
this is not foolproof, and a rootkit could easily be written to evade it. This
gives you an idea of the constant malware vs. anti-malware arms race going
on. Anti-virus developers will detect a new type of malware and update their
systems to detect and remove it, then the malware authors will update their
malware to circumvent the anti-virus detection and removal techniques.
2.9.1.5 Sources
The primary source for this lecture’s material was Stallings and Brown’s
textbook Computer Security: Principles and Practice [46].
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CHAPTER 3
CONCLUSION
Although still a new discipline, digital forensics has already become an im-
portant resource in our legal justice system. In addition to providing evidence
in many types of investigation, digital forensics skills find broad application
in areas such as data recovery and diagnostics.
The rapid growth of the field has imposed several significant difficulties on
the digital forensics education community.
• Not least of these difficulties is the pressing need for standardization
imposed by the importance of the field and the need to establish cred-
ibility within the forensic science community, even though the theory
and practice of digital forensics are still rapidly evolving.
• Demand for continuing professional education and certification puts
pressure on educators to develop training based programs that teach
digital forensics as a stepwise laboratory procedure, neglecting the theo-
retical foundations of the techniques. While these type of programs are
valuable for their part, without giving the next generation of commu-
nity leaders a strong theoretical foundation, we cannot hope to secure a
lasting position for digital forensics as a legitimate scientific discipline.
• Digital forensics is currently suffering from a lack of appropriate text-
books for a course in higher education. While there are many excellent
resources available for practitioners wishing to update their skills, a
textbook with an in-depth coverage of the foundational concepts and
technology for digital forensics has yet to be written [5].
• The lack of adequate textbook resources increases the reliance of digital
forensics education on the personal experience of the instructor, and
finding qualified instructors is one of the most difficult challenges in
establishing a digital forensics education program [10], [5].
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• The interdisciplinary nature of digital forensics makes selecting appro-
priate prerequisites difficult. Digital forensics techniques have natural
knowledge prerequisites in computer science and law, but incoming
students are unlikely to have a background in both.
To help address some of these difficulties, we are developing a new certifi-
cate program in digital forensics. When completed, this program will consist
of an introductory course and an advanced course with accompanying lab-
oratory sessions. Our curriculum is designed to be easily adopted by other
institutions, and we plan to distribute it as a curriculum package includ-
ing everything a computer science professor would need to teach the course.
We intend to continue revising and improving our curriculum based on feed-
back from the digital forensics research and education communities, student
responses, and future technological developments. Thus we can simultane-
ously address unforeseen logistic problems we hear about and improve our
curriculum to more closely meet the community’s needs.
At the time of writing, we have developed the curriculum for our introduc-
tory course and taught a pilot class. The curriculum for the advanced course
is currently under development, and we intend to offer an online version of
both courses in the future.
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